Steelmanning the Reptilians (and Still Not Buying the Lore)

Game theory and the 2026 UAP update: a fair look at the Greys, Reptilians, Mantids and Nordics lore, a graph-theory research program for weighing the evidence, and why I still don’t buy it.

(article first posted on Substack)


Someone commissioned a blog post about my latest thinking on Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAPs) and Non-Human Intelligence (NHI). This is the result.

Epistemic status: first principles theoretical thinking, research program ideation, and evidence analysis and aggregation.


TL;DR

Based on my recent research, thinking and modeling on the topic, here are the most significant highlights:

  1. The Sovereign Limitations Hypothesis (SLH). When you imagine a smart technological civilization, you should think not only about the implications of a destabilizing intelligence explosion, but also about how such a civilization would reason about it in advance and try to protect itself from its consequences. You see, at a more fundamental level than the three core components needed for evolution (reproduction, selection and variation), there is a universal principle already at play. As Dawkins puts it in The Selfish Gene (ch. 2): “Darwin’s ‘survival of the fittest’ is really a special case of a more general law of survival of the stable. The universe is populated by stable things. A stable thing is a collection of atoms that is permanent enough or common enough to deserve a name.” So, presumably, in anticipation of a runaway technological FOOM at the civilizational scale, as it were, you will have efforts to stabilize the power structure, the society, and the type of beings that compose it. But right before that happens, there may very well be escapees. This may fundamentally bifurcate the kinds of beings you might encounter in the universe: those that escaped and became stealthy parasites, and those that remained within the civilizational clampdown. To a first approximation, the so-called classic “Greys” may be some kind of cosmic parasites, the “Reptilians” some kind of defenders (those who stayed behind and maximized their stability), and the “Mantids” the manifestation of something akin to a civilizational immune system, perhaps under the control of the defenders.
  2. Two important updates. Yes, evidence points to there probably being weird things in the sky (a stubborn hypothesis hard to get rid of). However, the much stronger update is that what I call the Institutional Pathology Hypothesis (IPH) increased substantially in probability. If you take the data points you encounter at face value, my Bayesian updating takes “some UAP are non-human technology” from 5% to 32%. But it only grows to about 11% if you collapse the witnesses down to the sources that all the credible data points ultimately trace back to, namely if the AAWSAP/AATIP network counts as effectively one witness. Subjectively I feel it is significantly smaller, but this is what I got with my analysis.
  3. The origin of the reptilians is perhaps an excellent example of the IPH at play. Nine “independent sources” turn out to have only three informational roots, out of which the others are derived: the AFOSI disinformation (what I call the container), pulp fiction plus occultism (aka. the costume), and the Protocols (the plot). We don’t find anybody who has actually seen a reptilian in a credible way.
  4. Balance theory. Folklore and the collective imagination depict a very consistent friend-and-enemy clustering pattern in networks of agents, and there are theorems you can rigorously derive about why a perfectly consistent story has to look like that (see: balance theory). But based on game-theoretic considerations, the best model doesn’t usually turn out to be balanced, and in this case the Reptilians may be what I describe as brokers.
  5. Most importantly, a research program, plus an outline of what would change my mind, and what I think should change yours: the PURSUE files, NUFORC reports and DMT trip reports with specific qualities. One thing I’m proposing here is to look for achromatic lensing around craft (gravity bends every color by the same amount, whereas heat shimmer doesn’t), which is a prediction you can go out and check in future sightings with the right equipment. Alternatively, a pre-1979 depiction, credible report, or artifact that explicitly discusses underground reptilians and goes beyond the three informational roots here identified.

Several months ago I asked on Twitter whether anyone would be interested in commissioning technical analyses or opinion pieces from me as consulting tasks, as a way to help fund the Qualia Research Institute. One of my readers responded, and they were generous enough to sponsor this post. I want to thank them for their trust and interest, for their curiosity about my thinking, for a weird and generous consulting task, and for their patience, both with how long this took and with my unusual approach and methods. They asked for my latest thoughts on unidentified aerial phenomena (UAPs, formerly known as UFOs), including a fair steelman of the existence of beings such as the Reptilians and an honest account of what I think of them (spoiler: I still find them unlikely).

To be honest, I’m also grateful that this was the task, because it’s a topic I find intrinsically interesting. I probably wouldn’t have cared much about it if it weren’t for the work of journalists like Leslie Kean, the growing public interest, and the rather stunning historical accounts. But when I received the request I did already think the topic was fascinating, because it seems there might in fact be something strange going on in disguise, even if we really have no idea what it is. I’ve been thinking about it mostly in my free time, after my core research for the day is done.

Let me say where I’m coming from. I’m not in the category of people who wear a shirt saying “I want to believe”. I think the universe is fascinating as it is, and between consciousness and the nature of existence I don’t need something weird like this to experience intense wonder on a day-to-day basis (I already have a kind of hyperphilosophia triggered by “ordinary” things like the fact there is anything at all). But given how weird the reports are, and the attention they’re getting from people who are quite smart and, as far as we can tell, don’t lack integrity, I think the topic deserves some attention by people with creative/underexplored approaches. I also think it’s important for intellectual freedom, and for the culture, to be willing to examine any hypothesis closely with one’s own expertise and frameworks when there’s a case that the expected value is worth it.

Another reason I find this worth investigating is the possible overlap between psychedelic entity encounters, especially on DMT, and UAP phenomena. The person who commissioned this post wanted my thoughts on that too. If there is a real connection, it would drastically change my understanding of these experiences. Having explored this space a lot myself, I remain agnostic about the independent existence of at least some of the entities we encounter, though I do think a good number of DMT entity encounter phenomena are internally generated. At QRI, and out of personal interest, I’m very curious to model, understand, replicate, and visualize these phenomena (see: QRI’s HEART), and if interaction with other entities is part of them, that would be essential for interpreting what these experiences mean (and their very mechanism).

In 2023 I asked here on Qualia Computing whether DMT entities and UFOs are connected, in the context of Robin Hanson’s thoughts on alien politics and my own reflections on subagents and what you could call “internal politics”. Then, in January 2025, I wrote UFOs as Cosmic Parasites, which gave the benefit of the doubt to the reports of Grey aliens and their strange behavior, and thought through how gravitational technologies, governance and evolutionary selection pressures would interact. I arrived at what I thought was a fairly novel and internally consistent explanation space, while still openly assigning the whole area fairly low probability. This post builds on both. The Greys as cosmic parasites become half of the new hypothesis.

What has happened in 2026 is fascinating. In February, Barack Obama said in a public interview that aliens are real, even though he hasn’t seen them (literally: “they’re real, but I haven’t seen them”). He later clarified that he was thinking hypothetically, given how large the universe is, but some people read it as concrete steps towards controlled disclosure (cf. catastrophic disclosure) with plausible deniability. On February 20, Donald Trump ordered the UAP files released through the Department of War (formerly, or also, or instead, the Department of Defense, depending on whom you ask). Since then there have been seven releases, from May 8 to October 23, with hundreds of files in a variety of formats. Unfortunately they don’t contain enough information to pin down the nature of these phenomena, and there is clearly information being withheld that could help the scientific effort (e.g. proper metadata). If anything, a lot of what we learn comes from what they haven’t released and from what they have redacted. Jay Stratton, who led the Pentagon’s UAP Task Force, published a memoir in October about his own encounters with non-human beings. And perhaps most bizarrely, on September 30 David Grusch told Joe Rogan about retrieval footage showing human-looking beings, and passed on stories from colleagues about seven-foot beings with scaly skin, while making clear that he hadn’t seen those himself. So the “Reptilians” are actually topical and in vogue in 2026! Although, to be fair, Grusch’s version is second-hand, and it comes through the same insider network that, as I’ll argue later, should probably count as one witness rather than many.

Where do I stand? I mean, this research has actually updated me in two ways at once. On the one hand, I do think there are genuinely unusual things in the sky. On the other hand, and even more so, I’ve updated toward what I’m calling the Institutional Pathology Hypothesis (IPH), which is basically the idea that compartmentalization in institutions generates and amplifies stories that look independent when they really aren’t, and that this might explain a lot of how the information ends up being hyped and memetically resilient. Thus, this post is neither debunking nor advocacy for believing. I’m doing something more meta.

Here’s the road map for this post: In part one I introduce an idea that I’m discussing for the first time, at least with this name: the Sovereign Limitations Hypothesis (SLH). (Hat tip to Scott Alexander for encouraging people to coin concept handles. A good handle lets the mind gather ideas into one bucket, and it creates a Schelling point, i.e. a natural linguistic default that people can converge on without having to coordinate so that the research community can contribute to an explanation space.) Stated plainly, civilizations that survive a technology explosion are precisely the ones that figure out how to limit their own runaway technological development, and those that fail to do so may, for good evolutionary reasons, become stealthy cosmic parasites. With SLH in mind I reinterpret the widely reported “species”, or whatever this perceptual interface is that humans have with non-human sapient technological entities: the Greys, the Reptilians, the Mantids and the Nordics, at least as lore, if not as archetypes or real beings. In part two I propose a research program for this topic, drawn from the mathematical and data-analysis tools I use in my day job. I’m not a ufologist, but at the very least these tools bring a new analytic lens to the field: using theoretical graph theory and applied statistical analysis of graphs to study (a) who heard what from whom, which is what the IPH is about; (b) how much evidence a claim really has once you stop double counting; and (c) the friend-and-enemy structure of the four species, which has been studied in theory and in empirical networks, especially large online communities, but never applied, to my knowledge, to sources of information about UAPs.

So in a way these are two pretty different kinds of contribution: one is a speculative theory and the other a research program, and while they overlap, I think you can take one and leave the other (really, just take whatever bits you find useful or interesting). Everything here is toy models and/or a research proposal; I’m not trying to reach a strong verdict on whether anything weird lives under New Mexico. If you quote this post to argue that “Andrés says reptilians are real” without quoting this paragraph, we’ll know you’re doing it in bad faith or didn’t read the post. So please quote this line if you want to make the case that I’ve gone crazy.

As a mix of sanity check and a way to understand what people believe, I also ran a few Twitter polls while finishing this, and I compare them with the models along the way. My audience isn’t representative of humanity, or of any well-defined subculture other than the weird overlap of people who enjoy thinking about qualia and consciousness research, psychedelics, meditation, models of those, and my shitposts. If you voted, I hope this gives you a reason to read on. The numbers I quote are from the early morning of November 16, 2026, right before posting. Three of the four polls were still open then, so the embedded tweets may show slightly different final results.

The Sovereign Limitations Hypothesis

So, let’s talk about the Sovereign Limitations Hypothesis (I also considered “Survival of the Self-Bound” as a concept handle, but I actually like this one better.) This is something I’ve been thinking about a lot, because it goes straight at the default reason why I tend to reflexively discard any meaningful probability for UFO reports, lights in the sky, abduction stories and so on. When I first considered the possibility, I was very much imagining an intelligence explosion or technological singularity scenario as the main trajectory for a civilization like ours (a picture I’ve complicated before in The Complex Plot of the Nested Gods). In that picture it just seems natural that once you advance above a certain level of technological capability, you create von Neumann machines that basically eat as much of the universe as possible, and you do so close to the speed of light.

When I was in college my friends and I would organize once a year an all-day event for the Stanford Transhumanist Association called “Advancing Humanity”. The one in March 2013 was put together with Faust Whale, Karl Cobbe and Juan-Carlos Foust, and we invited Stuart Armstrong, then at Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute, who gave a talk called “Space Colonization Made Easy”. The important insight I took away is this: naively, you may think we will build craft and go to other planets, and then those planets will send craft to other planets, and so on, spreading in an organic, graph-like way through the galaxy and then to other galaxies. But the default high-tech scenario would instead involve von Neumann probes that spread as soon and as fast as possible everywhere. First you eat Mercury. You build a robot factory that produces robots that build another robot factory and so on, growing exponentially and beginning the process of covering the sun with a Matrioshka Brain. Being that close to the Sun, there are a lot of ways in which you can power up the task of consuming Mercury for raw material for your civilization in years to decades, maybe centuries, rather than tens of thousands or millions of years. And then, if you can miniaturize a seed of your civilization to the size of a grain of rice, you wouldn’t hop from planet to planet at all or even travel yourself in a spaceship (why waste so much matter and energy when you could achieve much more far more cheaply?). You would just shoot these tiny seeds out close to the speed of light, first aiming towards the furthest galaxies, because every year that you wait there will be galaxies that will never be reachable given the unstoppable expansion of the universe (see: Armstrong and Sandberg’s “Eternity in Six Hours”.)

So, presumably, if there had ever been any intelligent life out there at the level of humans, with technological capabilities of at least a certain level beyond where we are, then why are we here? Why haven’t we been eaten up by nanobots? Similar to many other thinkers, I would simply imagine that perhaps life is actually pretty rare, or that there’s a Great Filter, as Robin Hanson hypothesized.

The Sovereign Limitations Hypothesis is instead the perspective that preserving your values through a technological explosion is very technically challenging, and on two fronts.

The first front is at home. The explosion might destroy your civilization, because replicators at different levels (think multi-level selection) evolve and take over the society (and, if successful and ambitious, then all available matter and energy within your forward light-cone). Whether you like it or not, some replicator at some scale will either make the initial civilization collapse or it figures out how to stabilize itself. And I think you can reason, even just from an evolutionary perspective, that the technological explosion is self-limiting, or at least that this is a plausible perspective, because as soon as technologies of control advance above a certain level, the ability to control the entire civilization becomes available.

So what you might expect instead is that civilizations bifurcate into two distinct clusters. On the one hand you have the stabilization of the civilization, in whatever form it takes: a diplomatic committee, some kind of totalitarian regime, an archipelago. Some technology of control will essentially clamp down further (runaway) development. On the other hand, especially right before that happens, when there is very advanced technology but not yet the capacity to prevent its utilization by factions, there might be a wave of rogue agents, coalitions that escape before they can be clamped down.

The second front is abroad. There would be strong incentives to prevent escape, and to not send much out yourself either. Why? Because if you’re crossing very large regions of space and time to conquer other worlds, then, game theoretically, unless you have also solved control at the level where you can ensure that whatever goes over there doesn’t switch factions or rebel, with each iteration there’s a significant chance that you create an adversary to your own civilization. Just to put a rough number on it, if you cross 50,000 light-years in hops of 10 light-years, that’s about 5,000 generations of copies, and even if each generation only has a 1-in-1,000 chance of drifting away from what its makers wanted, by the time you reach the frontier only about 0.7% of the copies would still be loyal, which is pretty bad odds if you’re the one sending them. And if one of the breakaway civilizations does acquire a lot of power, the original one, the host organism in a sense, would be highly incentivized to neutralize it.

So I think this might explain why there could actually be a universe teeming with life that nonetheless looks empty. The life would be clustered into two kinds. On one side there are rogue factions that are parasitic, very hidden, and very difficult to get rid of. Maybe the way to get rid of them is to send probes, but then you expose yourself to those probes themselves becoming rebellious. So there’s a sense in which maybe you actually don’t care that much that they are out there. You just make sure that they don’t advance above a certain level of capability, and that you can destroy them if they do. The other big cluster would be defensible home bases, or defensible colonies. The entities or technologies you might encounter would roughly cluster into these two very different types of beings.

As far as I know, the closest cousin of this idea is Magnus Vinding’s work on quiet expansion and “cooperative silence”, where he suggests advanced civilizations might stay quiet in part because, in his words, “quiet expansion could aid internal coordination and alignment”. What SLH adds, I think, is to take that internal alignment problem and treat it as the selection pressure that decides who survives in the first place, and then to say that the ones who fail at it are the ones who end up as the parasites.

Greys as parasites, Reptilians as defenders

This perspective gives you a new way of thinking about the lore of the different entities and organizations. As a first approximation, the Greys may essentially be a parasitical breakaway faction. They might be like viruses. They may not even be in alliance with each other: just little probes trying to survive and replicate, and not necessarily exponentially, because then they would become more significant targets. The technology they have would be precisely the things that allow them to evade destruction, so the size of their ships may have a certain limit. They would be very difficult to catch: a breakaway wave of relativistic craft that emerges while a civilization is exploding in technology, before the technologies of control clamp down. In that sense they might be very cryptic. They might hide in the future, so to speak, as I discussed in UFOs as Cosmic Parasites. A lot of the strategy is hibernating, finding where in the galaxy they can parasitize, and traveling there.

Similarly, take the Reptilians, under the assumption that the lore that they live deep underground is true. They may be the kind of civilization that has optimized for defensiveness. They care about the Greys only to the extent that the Greys threaten their own survival. At the same time, the Greys might be very difficult to get rid of. So you would expect an ongoing immune system. Maybe the Greys actively use us, and biological life in general, for some resources, precisely because if they had a way of growing exponentially they would be identified and squashed. Any large cluster of them may be destroyed, so the strays might need to parasitize on some biosphere. And if you really want to take the lore all the way, you could even read something like the 1561 “aerial battle” over Nuremberg as a kind of periodic immune-system cleanup run by the residents. (I mean, to be fair, skeptics think the broadsheet shows a halo display, sun dogs basically, drawn through the religious and military imagery of the time, and even Jung, who made the image famous, thought it was most likely something natural seen through that lens.)

Another reason the parasites stay small: if a replicator starts to eat a star, that makes it very loud. And there might be a silent agreement between the host, or defender, civilizations to squash such things together. So, essentially, what survives is stealthy and lives off hosts, and its numbers might be capped by how many host civilizations exist.

One way to think of the Mantids, with their role in the lore of overseeing the Greys, is as immune cells escorting a pathogen, or maybe even containing and metabolizing it.

My best guess at the arrangement if all four were real (edges from −1, hostile, to +1, allied; rings show the split between restrainers in green and expanders in orange; the two shaded triangles are f
My best guess at the arrangement if all four were real (edges from −1, hostile, to +1, allied; rings show the split between restrainers in green and expanders in orange; the two shaded triangles are frustrated and both go through the Reptilians)

How expensive is interstellar travel?

The scenarios also look very different depending on whether relativistic travel is expensive, or cheap, or whether there are faster-than-light options or wormholes.

If relativistic travel is very expensive, then anything here has been here for a long time. It sounds quite likely that the four “species” are actually different branches or components of a single resident host civilization (or three of them are, and the Nordics are just us).

If relativistic travel is cheap, then I think this is where the Greys-as-parasites picture gets stronger. Just to give you a sense, a one-ton object at 99% of the speed of light hits with something like 130 gigatons, and if you launch it from ten light-years away it arrives only about five weeks after its own light, so first strikes become really terrifying. And so being buried deep underground is precisely what would let a resident civilization survive a first strike and still be able to defend itself, which would also kind of put them in a broker role between the different kinds of travelers.

If faster-than-light travel or wormholes are possible, then a federation or a hegemony becomes quite plausible, and the alliance graph becomes balanced. In which case the folkloric perspective that there are two camps might actually fit the story. Funnily enough, that is the least physically conservative of the three scenarios, and it’s also the one the most extreme reported flight characteristics would point to.

The three travel regimes side by side.
The three travel regimes side by side.

Which parameters matter most?

There are some very important parameters here. One is whether lossless replication is possible. This might be harder than you imagine, because lossless replication may itself require sufficiently advanced technology, and if technologies of control emerge before it is developed, the escapees themselves won’t have access to it. It’s like viruses. A virus is, in some sense, rooting for its own genes in a given generation, but it can’t actually prevent itself from being overtaken by its own descendants and mutations.

Then there’s the enforcement range, because if the sky looks this quiet, you might need lurkers in quite a few star systems to keep it that way.

And finally, coercion versus vibe. If you take the perspective that violence is the only way to compel someone without understanding them, then you would expect coercion from the expanders, whereas vibe would favor the restrainers.

Speculative profiles of each player, with humanity added for calibration. Most of the columns kind of move together, and I suspect the variable underneath is whether you model the minds you’re dealing
Speculative profiles of each player, with humanity added for calibration. Most of the columns kind of move together, and I suspect the variable underneath is whether you model the minds you’re dealing with

Proposing a novel research program

Okay, so the second big perspective I want to share. I actually want to frame all of this primarily as a proposal for a research program, rather than as a given outcome. I don’t want to say “the probability that reptilians are living underground is this much, because of my analysis.” Instead I want to say that ufology, UAP research, and the search for non-human intelligence more broadly could get technically quite interesting, and there are quite a few ways in which that might happen.

With the current records, I think there are three ways in which graph theory, graph analysis and data-science techniques give us a very useful lens. What I’m showing in the pictures here is less a result than a proof of concept. That said, it is also research, and I did find it quite insightful to see it visualized for the first time.

One important thing up front. I have updated in the direction that there are super weird and quite unusual phenomena in the sky. And I do very much think that, at the very least at the level of human phenomenology, experiences of contacting non-human intelligences of various sorts are very real experiences. Of course some people make it up, but a lot of people don’t. In the largest free-text corpus of DMT trip reports we have (3,778 of them, posted to Reddit), almost half include an entity encounter, and reptilian and insectoid beings each show up in a few percent of those encounters. (I give a short version of my own DMT entity phenomenology near the end.) But honestly, one of the big updates I’ve made as I researched this topic further is the extent to which what I’m calling IPH, the Institutional Pathology Hypothesis, is actually supported.

One: who heard what from whom

So here’s the number one way in which graph analysis can help the field: tracking the structure of information flow.

I wrote the Institutional Pathology Hypothesis post on my Substack in August as a response to Robin Hanson, who had argued that after recent events the only live options are that some UFOs are what they appear to be, or that a powerful conspiracy has spent 75 years making people think so. I think there’s a third option that doesn’t need a coordinated conspiracy. I don’t want to fully recap the post, but some of the key points are these. When you have compartmentalization of information, as in black programs, or in agencies whose research requires a lot of compartmentalization, rumors can really snowball and escalate, because at first there’s a lack of clarity on how many parallel indicators or primary sources there actually are.

Let’s say you’re getting a piece of information from what seem like three independent colleagues. Actually, two of them may have had a conversation before, and the confidence of those two is the result of the mutually boosted confidence they got from talking to each other, but they cannot share the fact that they talked to each other. More so, maybe these two, in combination with the third one, have the same primary source. One of them might be giving you some details and another one other details, because what is perceived as classified or treated with care is handled on a case-by-case basis. People may feel comfortable sharing a few details that are in a gray zone of legality, but not the full story. So if you’re doing detective work and trying to piece together a big story, there might be just one or two primary sources that over time snowball into what looks like a vast conspiracy, or a vast network of seemingly independent sources of information.

To make it concrete with a toy example, let’s say you start at 1%, and every genuinely independent, credible report makes the claim three times more likely. If you hear it from three independent colleagues, your odds go up by 27, and you end up at about 21%. But if all three of them actually trace back to the same primary source, you really only get to multiply by 3 once, and you’re at about 3%. And the people could be equally sincere in both cases! The sevenfold difference is just about who talked to whom.

In the original post I also talk about two other mechanisms. One is a kind of selection effect. Imagine a thousand intelligence officers hear some weird rumor; most of them probably assume it’s a program they’re not read into and just go back to work, and so the few who think “aliens” are the ones who end up investigating, finding each other, and eventually talking to Congress. The other one is a feedback loop with Congress itself. I mean, a senator doesn’t need to believe a claim in order to investigate it, but once you have hearings and legislation that mention non-human intelligence, other insiders take that as a sign that Congress must have seen something, and then their concern in turn becomes more evidence for Congress.

A common counterargument is that once everybody had a phone camera, there was no giant resurgence of sightings. (That exact point showed up in the comments of that post from Steven Lehar. It’s funny how the world sometimes plays out like a live-action movie where recurring characters make an appearance: Lehar is part of QRI’s lineage, and readers of this blog may remember his Cartoon Epistemology.) It’s a fair point, with the caveat that, as Hanson notes, the objects tend to appear near the edge of visibility, which is exactly where phone cameras will perform worst.

Likewise, there is evidence of intelligence agencies actually seeding wrong information, and there are good incentives to do so. If you’re working on very advanced technology, you may not want your adversaries to know that, so if you pretend that it comes from an outer source, that may actually help you protect yourself. In the late 70s and the 80s, Air Force counterintelligence (AFOSI) was causally involved in bringing the aliens and the underground base to Paul Bennewitz’s awareness (call them visions, elaborations or fabrications, whatever we want), and Bill Moore, unbelievably, more or less confessed on stage in 1989 to spying on him for them. I wonder how many people bought the story in the first place, and how few heard the confession. And of course, when you make a correction, not everybody hears it, so the story keeps percolating through the culture. It’s like when I correct one of my Twitter posts: if the incorrect version went viral, only a small percentage of people may ever read the correction. So we also have to take into account the memetic spread of information, how culture assimilates it, which can be asymmetrical and amplify whatever is in fashion rather than a rational Bayesian perspective that documents all the sources.

In 2024, AARO’s historical review found that a lot of the crash-retrieval story comes from a small group of people describing and talking about each other. In 2025 the Wall Street Journal reported that an officer gave falsified saucer photos to a bar owner close to Area 51 to obfuscate stealth tests, and that briefings about a fake alien program, “Yankee Blue”, were a hazing ritual that went on until 2023. An officer who believed it would turn out to be an honest crash-retrieval witness, polluting the information commons.

What I want to show, as a proof of concept, is the likely network of information flow for the different claims about reptilians.

What it looks like from inside the community: nine sources, each apparently confirming the others.
What it looks like from inside the community: nine sources, each apparently confirming the others.
What the provenance shows. Dashed edges are scholarly interpretations or resemblances rather than documented hand-offs.
What the provenance shows. Dashed edges are scholarly interpretations or resemblances rather than documented hand-offs.

From the outside you see about nine sources: insiders, a security guard, researchers, a journalist, even an interview with a reptilian. When you trace them back, you find three roots, which I think of as the container, the costume and the plot.

The container, a secret underground base where aliens and the government collude, comes from that AFOSI operation against Bennewitz. There really was a real secret to protect: he was recording signals from around Kirtland Air Force Base and the Manzano nuclear weapons storage area. And Bennewitz’s aliens were Greys, by the way.

On the costume side, Robert E. Howard’s serpent men of 1929 lead to the occultist Doreal, which leads to Icke, according to the historian Michael Barkun, with Sitchin’s Anunnaki added along the way. And the reptiles were only added to Dulce in the 1990s, through Branton’s Dulce Book and, “Thomas Castello”, whom nobody has been able to show existed.

On the plot side, we have the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, an antisemitic forgery with very clear political motives. Bill Cooper’s 1991 reprint in Behold a Pale Horse told readers to read “Illuminati” instead of “Jews”, and from there it reached David Icke in 1999. Again, there’s an effective filter at work here, and motivated cognition is very likely present.

This analysis, in turn, results in what I assess to be effectively zero independent observations of a reptilian.

Before posting this I asked my Twitter followers where they think the reptilian-overlord stories mostly come from. This poll is still open and it may change by the time you read this (I set it, like most of my polls on X, formerly known as Twitter, to close after 24 hours). Right before posting (358 votes), the most common answer was an archetype (45%), then pulp fiction and occultism (~34%), then real beings (~15%), and, interestingly, government disinformation at only ~7%. That’s surprising, given the documented existence of such programs. The AFOSI operation is the source with the clearest path of who said what to whom, and strangely it got the fewest votes.

When you compare the ~15% for real beings with the roughly 4% of Americans who told pollsters in 2013 that reptilians control the world, you get an interesting contrast. (That 4% is the origin of Scott Alexander’s “Lizardman’s Constant”, another sweet concept handle: about 4% of people will give the absurd answer to any poll, which is a good reminder that some of my 15% may be jokes too.) It’s a different question, my followers are far from a random sample, and to my knowledge Americans haven’t been polled on this recently, so I can’t tell from this alone whether it reflects a difference between my audience and Americans, or a change over time.

And again, I’m not disputing at the object level that there might be a phenomenon here. But I am saying that it is important to temper one’s updates, especially when they are enhanced by the sense of having independent sources of information.

I also asked people who have used DMT or ayahuasca whether they’ve ever met an unmistakably reptilian entity (scales, lizard or snake head, not just vaguely alien), and if so, how it treated them. Right before posting (286 votes, poll still open), 81.1% have never met one, and of course non-users of DMT also voted, I’m sure, because people are curious about the answers. Of those who presumably have encountered one, a neutral or clinical presentation is the most common at ~45%, the benevolent side (they’re kind, or they’re teachers) is ~35%, and a hostile presentation is ~20%. Of course, “hostile” could just be a vibe, or some features of the entity, or your own mood, and we can’t fully disambiguate this without controlled experiments (hashtag DMTx experiments, for the future). But if it were the conspiracy reptilian leaking into trips, in other words the set and setting of the cultural imagination, you would expect the hostile narrative to be the most prevalent one. Instead it is the least common, at least in this sample. A real survey, more general and maybe selecting people with quite a bit of first-hand experience, would include pre-1999 (pre-Icke) experiences. The sample would be smaller and memory might be faulty, but hopefully we can find a treasure trove of DMT reports from before then and compare the percentages of mentions.

Two: how much evidence is there, really?

This takes me to the second one, which is using belief propagation and network analysis, treating the whole body of evidence as a Bayesian network, in order to identify how strong the evidence for a certain claim actually is. And I think there’s a cute technical point here, which is that belief propagation on a network with loops is known to double count evidence, since a message can go around a cycle and come back looking like new information, and that’s really just the mathematical version of circular reporting.

So, on the Bayesian timeline, I went through the main events from Leslie Kean’s 2010 book to the seventh release of Pentagon UAP files on October 23, 2026 (still the latest as I write this), and gave each event a likelihood ratio for each of seven hypotheses. Of course, this involves judgment calls, but I want you to look at the shape of the update process. I do believe the shape, at the very least the first derivative (when things go up and down), is valid and defensible, even if the exact values are debatable. If this were a research-grade investigation, I would build a proper model with Markov chain Monte Carlo, assigning different credences to different sources within a particular world model, and you could arrive at your own Bayesian curve, but that might be for another time, and for a researcher who isn’t as busy as I am. If you take the sources at face value, “some UAP are non-human technology” goes from 5% to 32%. But once you prune the information by understanding the overlapping sources and the double-counting circularity, counting the AAWSAP/AATIP-connected insiders (the 2017 New York Times story, Grusch, the 2024 hearing, Barber, The Age of Disclosure and Stratton’s memoir) as one witness instead of six, you get only 11%. Even this makes me feel uncomfortable, in the sense that I feel it’s too high, but it’s what the process led me to, and sometimes going through the process gives you a number you weren’t expecting. I admit I may have a bias against updating too much here. Nonetheless, it is much less than face value, which is what you’d end up with if you just kept refreshing r/UFOs and consuming those news sources without checking how they’re all connected to each other. And the biggest updates went to the IPH, given AARO’s 2024 “circular reporting” finding and the WSJ’s 2025 reporting.

There’s also something to say about evidence that should be there and isn’t. A president has ordered what could, at least on the surface, be read as disclosure, and after hundreds of released files there is no retrieval program to be found in them, or even inferred without considerable effort. And the evidential trail closes a loop, which I find satisfying: the timeline opens with the 2017 New York Times story about the Bigelow-run program, and it ends with release 7, which contains some of that program’s own reports from 2009 and 2010.

Sixteen years of UAP news as Bayesian updates (solid = AAWSAP/AATIP insiders counted as one witness, dashed = every event at face value, purple dots = network-linked events)
Sixteen years of UAP news as Bayesian updates (solid = AAWSAP/AATIP insiders counted as one witness, dashed = every event at face value, purple dots = network-linked events)
Where each hypothesis ends up, at face value and with the insiders counted as one witness (the last column is the single event that moved it most)
Where each hypothesis ends up, at face value and with the insiders counted as one witness (the last column is the single event that moved it most)

I also asked for people’s credence in non-human technology. This one is final, because I set it to close after only six hours (191 votes): under 1% got ~38%, over 50% got ~36%, between 1% and 10% got ~15%, and 10% to 50% got ~11%. The core takeaway is a bifurcation, a polarization of perspectives. And yes, my own estimate sits in the least popular bin. But the median voter lands somewhere between 1% and 10%, which is close to the institutional-pathology-adjusted number, the one that takes into account how these things get double counted, or the circular amplification of information.

Three: who is friends with whom?

And finally, where I’ll go a bit more in depth: triad analysis. There’s quite a bit of research on human networks built on this principle. It’s of course never absolutely the case, but there are statistical tendencies where the friend of your friend is your friend, the enemy of your enemy is your friend, and so on. Fritz Heider called this balance back in 1946. The technical version is that a signed network is balanced when every triangle has an even number of hostile edges. And when a triangle isn’t balanced (say A and B are friends, B and C are friends, but A and C are enemies), it’s called frustrated, and usually somebody in it is playing Switzerland, staying friendly with two rivals at once.

From first principles, you can expect that if the story you assemble is too neat, and all the triangles are balanced, that might actually suggest anthropomorphization in how people put the folklore together. So in some sense, if you do a very thorough triadic analysis and find that the most plausible friend-and-enemy configuration for the four species most often talked about (the Greys, the Reptilians, the Mantids and the Nordics) comes out as something kind of weird and tricky, I actually find that more plausible than if it exactly fits human intuition. If it exactly fits human intuition, I’m not really sure it works out.

There is research that tries to predict alliances in human networks, even across countries, with this friend-versus-enemy concept. For example, Antal, Krapivsky and Redner modeled how the European alliances from 1872 to 1907 kind of settled into the two balanced blocs that went into World War I, and Axelrod and Bennett tested their “landscape theory” of alignment on seventeen European nations in World War II. You can in some sense start thinking of history less as the record of what happened and more as what happened in the context of what could have happened. Take the Second World War. The fact that the capitalists and the communists ended up allied against the fascists wasn’t determined. From August 1939 until June 1941 the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany had a non-aggression pact and split Poland between them. Other alliances were plausible, and what emerges at the macroscopic level very often defies human intuition.

So what I did was explore all of the possible configurations of alliances and enmities among the four, plus a third possible relation: “they’re actually the same entity”. For four species that gives 127 possible worlds, of which only 47 are balanced. I scored them not just against the raw number of accounts, or even the raw number of credible accounts, but against the accounts after the evidentiary weight adjustments that come from the very real, even if not fully explanatory, institutional pathology.

Top 12 of the 127 worlds on strategy alone, with the share of the parameter grid each one wins (blue = allied, dashed red = hostile, purple double line = same entity under the hood). Most winners are
Top 12 of the 127 worlds on strategy alone, with the share of the parameter grid each one wins (blue = allied, dashed red = hostile, purple double line = same entity under the hood). Most winners are unbalanced, and the usual broker is the Reptilians
Left, the folklore (only the edges the lore states confidently), a clean two-camp story with Reptilians, Greys and Mantids against the Nordics. Right, the best fit on strategy alone, where the Reptili
Left, the folklore (only the edges the lore states confidently), a clean two-camp story with Reptilians, Greys and Mantids against the Nordics. Right, the best fit on strategy alone, where the Reptilians broker between rival Greys and Mantids and the triangle is frustrated

I explored this space quite comprehensively with the help of computational modeling, across 405 parameter settings. The best world within this space is unbalanced 76% of the time, versus a base rate of 63%. In the folklore you essentially see no frustrated triangles, although, as a caveat, its confident edges only close one triangle. Real strategists would show brokers and cross-cutting deals. The folklore instead reads like a morality play, an Aesop fable if you will. There’s a general memetic bias for us versus them, good versus evil, who is helping us, and so on. But real multi-agent systems are usually more complex, so if a story fits your own intuitions too well, you can take that as evidence against it.

When it comes to alliances (88 votes when I last checked, poll still open), “every faction for itself” is the most popular answer at ~56%. It seems people think it’s a free-for-all, every species for itself. “One group with many masks” got ~25%, the two-camps perspective ~13%, and the Reptilians as brokers only ~6%. The takeaway is that when you ask people directly, at least in this sample, the folklore’s two camps don’t emerge. Instead you get mutually hostile factions, which in this context is what James Davis called weak balance (more on that below).

There is also a subagent twist. It may very well be that every civilization ends up with this bifurcation into coalitions of restrainers and expanders. The balance would then arrive along ideological and technological lines (what were they able to take out before a clampdown happened?) rather than along our tribal intuitions, which would draw the lines by species, and so every species-to-species relation would look mixed. The Lacerta Files (a pseudonymous 1999 interview that its own German translator called a hoax) are fascinating in this respect (if you’d rather listen, Area52’s Debriefed has a full readout). At the very least they’re great science fiction, and they have a really interestingly nuanced perspective on non-human sapient politics: “there are NO absolutely good and there are NO absolutely bad species”, and individuals “are able to decide freely for themselves”, just as you find really complex politics within the human species. To that you have to add that the boundaries between species may get fuzzy once you have genetic technologies. You could argue that the real divisions have to do with the mental structures and subagent coalitions among individuals, the autopoietic, or what I’d call eigenmemetic, clusters of ideas, individuals and subagents that reinforce and protect themselves, not even at the level of genes (a theme from Jailbreaking Out of the Replicator Matrix). Once you have sapience, power and technology, the selection pressures, as David Pearce very wisely points out, act in anticipation of their effects. So we have to stop thinking only in Dawkinsian terms. The selfish gene is a very important lens for understanding evolution on Earth, but it becomes very non-trivial once you extend it to sapient species. I’d say, therefore, that the folklore’s mistake, which is quite significant and perhaps fatal for a lot of the analysis we humans make, is to draw the lines between species. I’d like to see more analysis that turns the political divide not into racial ones but into a much more sophisticated memetic lens, and at the end of the day a qualia computing one. The racial perspective is ultimately how the story dovetailed into antisemitism.

The subagent version (restrainers white, expanders black), balanced again, but the camps cut across all four species, so from outside every species-to-species relation looks mixed (see table)
The subagent version (restrainers white, expanders black), balanced again, but the camps cut across all four species, so from outside every species-to-species relation looks mixed (see table)
The folklore’s full graph, to compare with the strategic one: balanced, split along species lines, and every player either wholly good or wholly bad
The folklore’s full graph, to compare with the strategic one: balanced, split along species lines, and every player either wholly good or wholly bad

Some graph theory fun facts

Here are a few results from graph theory and nearby fields that helped me think about all this.

Frank Harary proved in 1953 that a complete signed graph is balanced if and only if there are at most two camps.

Now, of course, once you introduce mixed arrows it gets more complicated, even within an individual, since a person is not necessarily entirely self-aligned. And pairs of people have subagents too. Put two friends together, and the parts of each of them that want a cigarette find each other. One cigarette becomes a drink, the drink becomes several, and a few hours later you’re drunk in the street calling your ex. Neither of you wanted that on your own; the alliance between your subagents did. Eliezer Yudkowsky’s idea of coherent extrapolated volition (CEV) points the other way: it’s what you would want if you knew more, thought it through, and your internal conflicts were resolved, so the coalition of your better parts gets to set the policy. That may not be how a real autopoietic, eigenmemetic architecture works, though; there’s a reason why we are internally conflicted, and it turns out to be very evolutionarily adaptive. Plus there are weights, so this is more like an energy function you’re trying to minimize than a strict theorem. Still, the theorem is very cool, because it says that a Manichean story comes out of mathematical necessity. James Davis (1967) relaxed one rule, so that the enemy of your enemy doesn’t have to be your friend, and then you can get any number of mutually hostile camps. That’s “weak balance”, and it’s much closer to rival empires; it becomes a kind of low-energy state of such a system.

Real networks do turn out to be fairly well balanced: Kirkley, Cantwell and Newman (2019) found this by every measure they tried, Leskovec, Huttenlocher and Kleinberg (2010) in Epinions, Slashdot and Wikipedia (with some exceptions), and Szell, Lambiotte and Thurner (2010) among some 300,000 players of Pardus, a browser-based multiplayer game set in space where players trade, fight and form alliances. So a very balanced alien graph has the signature of human conception rather than of something more natural.

Physicists call an unbalanced triangle “frustrated” (Toulouse, 1977). Think of three antiferromagnets, which can’t all point opposite to each other. A balanced graph is equivalent to a ferromagnet (the Mattis model), and a frustrated one is something like a spin glass, or the Swiss broker. Hong and Strogatz (2011) looked at conformist and contrarian Kuramoto oscillators and found they split into two clusters half a cycle apart, so balance shows up here as synchrony. Of course this connects to a lot of what we have explored at the Qualia Research Institute, namely the emergent attractors of different network topologies of Kuramoto oscillators (see How Coupling Kernels Shape Consciousness and Oscillatory Synchrony is Energetically Cheap). Kuramoto is just phenomenologically useful here, and I mean phenomenology in the physics sense: it replicates a lot of phenomena, even though, correct me if I’m wrong, no real oscillator behaves exactly like a Kuramoto one. It helps you arrive at nice analytic solutions, and we use it because it’s simple and because we care about phenomenology both in the physics sense and in the consciousness sense (but that’s an aside).

Judea Pearl’s belief propagation is exact on trees, but Yair Weiss (2000) showed that on graphs with loops it overstates the evidence. Information cascades (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992) are the social version. And false news spreads farther and faster than true news (Vosoughi, Roy and Aral, 2018), which is what information spread looks like once you take into account the real memetic selection pressures in culture.

Then there’s the intelligence world’s own curveball, literally: the case for Iraq’s mobile bioweapons labs rested on a single defector, codenamed “Curveball”, whose claims came back through several channels looking like corroboration, until the 2005 WMD Commission tore it apart. Richards Heuer’s Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (1999) is the CIA’s classic on weighing evidence against competing hypotheses rather than counting how much of it agrees. And xkcd has a word for the Wikipedia version of circular reporting: “citogenesis”.

GEIPAN is the unit of CNES, the French space agency, that has been investigating UAP reports since 1977, and it grades each case from A (fully identified) to D (still unexplained after investigation). Its share of D cases used to be around 28% (in 2007), and after reinvestigating old cases it’s now about 3%. So the unexplained share shrinks when people look harder, but it doesn’t go to zero.

And finally, the Bell number: there are 15 ways to group four species into “same entity under the hood” clusters. If we add signs between the clusters, there are 127 possible worlds, of which 47 are balanced.

A few more things worth mentioning

Stratton and other whistleblower news

Jay Stratton’s memoir (October 2026) states, in his words, “I have seen non-human beings”. It would be great to have this examined more closely, with lie detection, or an expert on body language looking at these descriptions, or a microphenomenologist interviewing him; I think that would be high expected value in terms of information gain. He also describes a nuclear submarine being used as bait, and there’s a nuclear link more generally: Bruehl and Villarroel (2025) found that transients on 1950s Palomar plates were about 45% more likely within a day of a nuclear test, whereas skeptics argue they are plate defects. Stratton is in the AAWSAP/AATIP network, so once you take double counting into account, he carries one witness’s weight, and that network may be the ultimate cause of this information cascade, which any epistemologically serious researcher should think about deeply. The P-3 sensor data is the one thing here that is testable, and I want to emphasize that I care about which testable aspects we can extract out of all this.

Then there’s the funny (strange, not ha-ha) NDA relief for whistleblowers talking to the PURSUE team, around mid-September. Dylan Borland gave a hedged account of recovered craft on Sean Hannity’s podcast, whatever epistemic value we may assign to such a venue, which comes with its own cultural selection pressures and potential editing for a particular impression; you’re at the mercy of the interviewer for what gets highlighted and with what tone. There’s no public outcome of his reprisal complaint as of late October, and there’s no November hearing to speak of.

Vallée’s control system

Jacques Vallée might say that the phenomenon behaves like a control system on human beliefs, a bit like a cat chasing a laser. Any contribution to the memetics of the topic may itself interact with the phenomenon, and there’s something anti-memetic here: if you make a prediction that becomes widely known, a control system wouldn’t try to fulfill it. But hey, here’s one prediction we can keep kind of low-key between us, and revisit if it ever comes true. If the manifestations track the culture and beliefs of each era (airships in 1896–97, flying saucers in 1947, then triangles and orbs, and nowadays interdimensional-looking or holographic beings and things in the sky that look like jellyfish), then the strangeness itself may serve no technical purpose. It could of course be some kind of hologram projected onto us, or whatever advanced technology is capable of. But if we can anticipate which technological metaphor will spread next, that’s perhaps how the phenomenon will manifest, so that it’s consumable by the right audience. I think reservoir computing will eventually catch on, as opposed to digital computation, so that’s where I’d look. And if you want examples of the “here for a long time under different guises” idea, people usually point to Nuremberg in 1561, the airship wave of 1896–97, and the foo fighters of World War II.

Six candidate worlds and their predictions (W1 includes Vinding’s silent rulers; W5 is Vallée’s control system, the only one predicting forms that track the era’s culture)
Six candidate worlds and their predictions (W1 includes Vinding’s silent rulers; W5 is Vallée’s control system, the only one predicting forms that track the era’s culture)
Coded catalogue of reported interactions involving unknowns. No modern case of two unknowns fighting each other (the only “battles” are two 16th-century broadsheets); most modern cases are single acto
Coded catalogue of reported interactions involving unknowns. No modern case of two unknowns fighting each other (the only “battles” are two 16th-century broadsheets); most modern cases are single actors in formation, launching, or pacing our aircraft

Magnus Vinding’s cooperative silence

Magnus Vinding’s Cooperative Silence piece offers a cooperative alternative within the dark forest family of hypotheses. It doesn’t require conflict or elimination, and it may very well be the case that quiet expansion is a strategic choice. SLH answers one of his open questions, whether a defector might quietly spread probes and then grow in a very loud way: in SLH, defectors drift into stealthy parasites that the quiet ones keep in check, at least enough to stop them getting out of control. What pushes me against a purely benevolent version of silent rulers is the reality of intense suffering, and perhaps the universality of valence (at QRI we think valence has a structural basis that any conscious system would share; see the Symmetry Theory of Valence). I can’t bring myself to imagine a benevolent motivation for leaving things as they are when something like cluster headaches exists, which sits at the far end of what we have argued are logarithmic scales of pain, where the worst experiences are orders of magnitude worse than ordinary bad ones. Why is DMT not yet available to every cluster headache patient? (I’ve made the case for it here before, along with practical notes on aborting and preventing attacks. The nonprofit ClusterFree, which I announced here last year, works on exactly this. The big insight from the emerging evidence on treating cluster headaches with DMT, which Alfredo Parra wrote after many conversations with Curran Janssens and me, is that patients report vaporized DMT stopping their attacks within seconds, or a couple of minutes at most, and even at sub-perceptual doses, so without any trip at all. Compare that to oxygen, the standard first-line treatment, which takes 10–15 minutes to kick in and is often denied by insurers. As far as I know there are no published efficacy trials yet, although a Yale-led international survey did just report an interim analysis.) There’s a kind of theodicy problem here. (Magnus and I talked about some of this in a conversation that should be public soon.)

My own DMT entity encounters (very briefly)

Writing up my own DMT entity encounters isn’t a priority for my core research (though I’ve written before about asking the entities questions, aligning them and the hyperbolic geometry of DMT experiences), which these days is mostly the mathematical modeling of what at QRI we call parametrized dynamic phenomenology. But here’s a short version. Out of many DMT experiences, there are about five or six that I’ve really struggled to make sense of in terms of brain or nervous-system dynamics, or the standard explanation space where I put most of my probability. Part of it is the hyperreal quality, which I’ve tried to explain elsewhere, but also object permanence, intact cognition and an intact sense of self.

Some entities turn a whole sequence of experiences into a thin, holographic tube and compare tubes side by side, almost as if they were evaluating your karmic footprint, based on your volition and what you did in different situations.

Then there are the mantis-like insectoids. I associate them with Buddha energies, a kind of Buddha field, and they show up especially at the waiting-room level. (If you break through, they become multi-headed and multi-armed, more like Hindu depictions of gods and goddesses; the insectoid, hyper-intelligent vibe is a waiting-room phenomenon.) They act like doctors looking into your energy system, and not just at something as prosaic as “energy blockages” (tongue in cheek), but at topological obstructions: ways in which you collide with yourself because you’re a poorly done projection of an energy system that actually lives in a higher-dimensional space. Forcing it into three dimensions creates geometric frustration and self-collisions, which may be, in some sense, the geometric implementation of trauma, or of a breakup, an interpersonal conflict, or damage you did to yourself through lack of sleep, poor diet or lack of exercise. The feeling is of an intelligent lifting operation. They take the tangle back into the higher dimension where it belongs, or even higher, reconfigure the network of energy flow so that it doesn’t collide with itself, and put it back into your three-dimensional space (or four-dimensional, if you count the pseudo-time arrow of tracers, as I’ve discussed here in the past, for example in LSD Ego Death). I’ve encountered this a number of times, so it isn’t an isolated incident, and when I’ve talked about it with other people with a lot of experience with the molecule, some have described similar, sometimes shockingly similar, experiences. It occasionally happens on psilocybin too, and of the other molecules, 4-AcO-DMT seems to boost the probability the most.

That said, my default reading is that these are projections of my own mind, with some unusual computation going on in the brain. This blog is called Qualia Computing for a reason, and I think the beamsplitter holography framework I’ve been developing here (see also Reverse Engineering DMT Phenomenology with Non-Linear Optics) may have a lot of explanatory power for the phenomenology of these mantis-like surgeries.

For comparison, in the Lawrence et al. (2022) corpus, reptilian beings appear in 3.0% of DMT entity encounters, mantis or insectoid beings in 2.3%, and Greys in about 1%, which is roughly the opposite of the abduction rankings. One way to read this is that the Greys are more of a physically embodied phenomenon, while reptilian semantics live more in mental space, as something you can only experience when tuned into a different plane, dimension or aspect of reality. A friend of mine, who usually has wonderful DMT experiences and takes it at festivals, once had a terrifying reptilian encounter with the vibe of a recruiting pitch: they were being led into secret-society knowledge about perverse power structures. I assign low credence to these encounters being what they seem, but it’s worth reporting.

Conclusion

So, in closing, recall the two updates. There really do seem to be strange things in the sky. And after doing this research and actually looking at graphs of information flow among the people who have reported these things, I’ve updated a lot toward the IPH being an important confounder, one that is underrated, or at least not considered enough, and certainly not formalized enough. If you remember one thing from this post, I hope it’s that.

On the reptilians specifically, nine apparent sources trace back to only three roots: an Air Force disinformation operation (the container), pulp fiction and occultism (the costume), and a forgery, the Protocols (the plot). So at least in this case, the effective number of independent observations may be zero. Grusch’s 2026 second-hand story adds one node, one more source, but not an independent entry point for trustworthy information. This is a claim about evidence. It can’t prove that nothing exists, and that distinction is important. Still, if the reasons intelligent, knowledgeable people believe something turn out not to be justified when you look carefully, that should lower your probability, especially if you were double counting and so contributing to a faulty information cascade. (Stated bluntly, this could be called a group hysteria around the topic, although I wouldn’t go quite that far.)

The polls point the same way. Among the people who answered, almost half think the reptilian stories trace back to an archetype in the mind, about 39% to pulp fiction or occultism, about 15% think they’re real beings, and only 7% said government disinformation. That surprised me, given that it’s the root with the most verifiable paper trail. On whether UAP are non-human, people split into camps, under 1% versus over 50%, and almost nobody sits in the middle. Either there are information cascades going on, or people have first- or second-hand experiences they consider trustworthy, although I don’t think the latter is consistent with other observations. My guess, and please treat it very much as a guess, is that the collective understanding on this topic underrates what can be documented as an institutional problem, and that the polarized views are an example of what double-counted evidence does on both sides. And the DMT reptilians, at least in these reported first-hand encounters, are more often neutral or kind than hostile, which doesn’t fit a conspiracy of a hostile species.

What would change my mind? I think it’s important to spell this out if you want to be a useful participant in the discourse. Any of these would move the needle for me: reports from before 1979 of reptilians living underground that fall outside the three roots I’ve identified; any reliable physical artifact; very well-measured, reliable lensing around a craft that is the same at every color, i.e. achromatic, which heat shimmer can’t explain; or craft types that co-occur in the PURSUE files in a way that’s consistent with the alliance structure discussed here. Polarization is another candidate: Kevin Knuth has pointed out that the huge magnetic fields implied by some reports would rotate the polarization of skylight through the Faraday effect, so a photo taken through a polarizing filter should show rings around the object, and at least one photograph published in 2012 appears to show them. More well-verified measurements like that would be important evidence, but I’d weight achromatic lensing even more. I’d argue that what I’m presenting is at least building blocks for science, if not science per se: background reasoning, theory and evidence tracking that lay out a possible scientifically valid framework. So, again, skeptics and believers alike, please don’t quote me out of context.

The folklore does have a real mistake, and it isn’t that there are two camps, since balance theory says a consistent story has to have two camps. The mistake is confusing a political divide with a species or racial one, and the reptilian story overlaps with antisemitism at least in its origin, if not partly in its propagation. I think of this as the moral payoff of the graph-theoretic analysis: these methods matter sociologically, not only for the UFO story.

I also want to offer an invitation. The data exists: the PURSUE files, the NUFORC reports, and the DMT report corpus as a whole, which I hope will keep improving in quality and specificity. The provenance graphs, the double-counting corrections and the triangle census are all projects that somebody who likes playing with data can pick up and run with. The ideal outcome of this post is that it inspires high-quality collaborators rather than passive readers (as long as it doesn’t distract them from more ethically pressing or higher expected value work). If you’re into 3D visualizations of graphs, applied graph theory in data science, or cracking the puzzle of the information flow and alliance networks here, drop me a comment, or even better, write your own post.

If people are curious and would like me to take this further, whether out of intrinsic interest or another commissioned piece, a future post could cover my DMT entity encounters in much more depth. Thanks again to Magnus Vinding, whose cooperative silence work is the closest prior literature to SLH, and to the funder, without whom this certainly wouldn’t have been written.

Infinite bliss, and take it easy, all beings, including the reptilians, despite their low probability mass.

Sources

My own posts. UFOs as Cosmic Parasites (2025); Are DMT Entities and UFOs Connected? (2023); Aligning DMT Entities (2023); The Institutional Pathology Hypothesis (2026). Robin Hanson, “US War Dept’s Big UFO Lie” (2025).

Expansion, silence and the Fermi question. Hart, “An explanation for the absence of extraterrestrials on Earth”, QJRAS (1975); Tipler, “Extraterrestrial intelligent beings do not exist”, QJRAS (1980); Hanson, “The Great Filter” (1998); Armstrong & Sandberg, “Eternity in six hours”, Acta Astronautica (2013); Hanson, Martin, McCarter & Paulson, “If loud aliens explain human earliness, quiet aliens are also rare”, ApJ (2021); Magnus Vinding, Silent cosmic rulers (2024) and The Cooperative Silence Hypothesis.

Graphs, balance and belief. Heider, “Attitudes and cognitive organization”, J. Psychology (1946); Harary, “On the notion of balance of a signed graph”, Michigan Math. J. (1953); Cartwright & Harary, “Structural balance”, Psychological Review (1956); Davis, “Clustering and structural balance in graphs”, Human Relations (1967); Toulouse, “Theory of the frustration effect in spin glasses” (1977); Pearl, Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems (1988); Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch, “A theory of fads, fashion, custom and cultural change as informational cascades”, JPE (1992); Axelrod & Bennett, A landscape theory of aggregation, BJPS (1993); Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (CIA, 1999); Weiss, “Correctness of local probability propagation in graphical models with loops”, Neural Computation (2000); Antal, Krapivsky & Redner, Dynamics of social balance on networks (2005); Leskovec, Huttenlocher & Kleinberg, “Signed networks in social media”, CHI (2010); Szell, Lambiotte & Thurner, “Multirelational organization of large-scale social networks in an online world”, PNAS (2010); Hong & Strogatz, “Kuramoto model of coupled oscillators with positive and negative coupling parameters”, PRL (2011); Vosoughi, Roy & Aral, “The spread of true and false news online”, Science (2018); Kirkley, Cantwell & Newman, Balance in signed networks, PRE (2019).

UAP research and ufology. Vallée, Passport to Magonia (1969), The Invisible College (1975) and “Five arguments against the extraterrestrial origin of unidentified flying objects”, J. Scientific Exploration (1990); Condon (ed.), Scientific Study of Unidentified Flying Objects (1969); Hynek, The UFO Experience (1972); Bullard, UFO Abductions: The Measure of a Mystery (1987); Mack, Abduction (1994); Jacobs, The Threat (1998); Sturrock et al., “Physical evidence related to UFO reports”, J. Scientific Exploration (1998); Clancy, Abducted (2005); Kean, UFOs: Generals, Pilots, and Government Officials Go on the Record (2010); Hernandez, Klimo & Schild (eds.), Beyond UFOs (2018); Knuth, talk on the physics of UAP (YouTube); Knuth, Powell & Reali, “Estimating flight characteristics of anomalous unidentified aerial vehicles”, Entropy (2019); ODNI, Preliminary Assessment: Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (2021); NASA UAP Independent Study Team report (2023); Watters et al., “The scientific investigation of UAP using multimodal ground-based observatories”, J. Astronomical Instrumentation (2023); Medina, Brewer & Kirkpatrick, An environmental analysis of public UAP sightings and sky view potential, Sci. Rep. (2023); AARO, Historical Record Report Vol. 1 (2024); Bruehl & Villarroel, “Transients in the Palomar Observatory Sky Survey (POSS-I) may be associated with nuclear testing and reports of unidentified anomalous phenomena”, Sci. Rep. (2025); GEIPAN statistics; United States UFO files (PURSUE releases, 2026); 1561 celestial phenomenon over Nuremberg.

Provenance of the reptilian story. Barkun, A Culture of Conspiracy (2003); Bishop, Project Beta (2005); Pilkington, Mirage Men (2010); Colavito, On the reptilians and the persistence of myth; Bill Moore (ufologist); Milton William Cooper; Reptilian conspiracy theory; Skeptoid on Dulce; Branton, The Dulce Book; Lacerta Files transcript, Area52’s readout and The Skeptic on its origin; WSJ on Pentagon-seeded UFO myths, June 2025 (summary); Public Policy Polling, conspiracy poll (April 2013).

DMT and cluster headaches. Parra, Janssens & Gómez-Emilsson, Emerging evidence on treating cluster headaches with DMT (2025); Schindler, Lenaburg & Wold, DMT use in cluster headache: interim analysis of an international survey, Neurology 106 (2026); ClusterFree; Gómez-Emilsson, Logarithmic scales of pleasure and pain (2019); QRI, The Symmetry Theory of Valence: 2020 overview.

DMT entities. Strassman, DMT: The Spirit Molecule (2001); Luke, “Discarnate entities and dimethyltryptamine (DMT)”, J. Society for Psychical Research (2011); Davis et al., “Survey of entity encounter experiences occasioned by inhaled N,N-DMT”, J. Psychopharmacology (2020); Michael, Luke & Robinson, “An encounter with the other”, Frontiers in Psychology (2021); Lawrence et al., Phenomenology and content of the inhaled N,N-DMT experience, Sci. Rep. (2022).

Appendix: the sources behind the edges of the reptilian graph

My working notes for the provenance graph in an edge by edge basis. Tags: documented (primary source or the person’s own admission), secondary (reliable secondary source), interpretation (a scholar’s reading), resemblance (a parallel, no proven hand-off), unverifiable.

The container: an Air Force operation

  • Kirtland / Manzano -> Paul Bennewitz. Documented. 1979–80, Albuquerque electronics businessman records signals and lights around Kirtland AFB and the Manzano nuclear weapons storage area, decides they’re alien. Bishop 2005; Pilkington 2010.
  • Kirtland -> AFOSI / Richard Doty. Documented. Counterintelligence gets involved because Bennewitz is watching classified stuff.
  • Doty -> Bennewitz. Documented. Doty and colleagues feed him aliens + underground base, steering him away from what he’s really seeing. Becomes his Dulce story (“Project Beta”). His aliens: Greys. Hospitalized 1988.
  • Doty -> Bill Moore, Moore -> Bennewitz. Documented. Moore admits at the MUFON symposium, Las Vegas, July 1, 1989, that he reported on Bennewitz to AFOSI and took part in the disinformation (speech printed in MUFON UFO Journal #259–260; Wikipedia summary). That Moore and Doty helped get Bennewitz committed: secondary accounts only.
  • Doty -> Linda Moulton Howe. Secondary. Howe says Doty showed her an alien “briefing paper” at Kirtland in 1983. Big amplifier afterwards.
  • Moore -> MJ-12 papers. Documented. Surface through Moore’s circle, 1984. FBI: bogus. Cooper later lectures on “the real MJ-12”.
  • Bennewitz -> John Lear -> Bill Cooper. Secondary. Lear’s 1987 “UFO Coverup” posts absorb the Bennewitz mythos, Dulce included. Cooper “heavily influenced” by Lear (later calls him a CIA plant).

The costume: fiction and occultism

  • Blavatsky -> Howard. Interpretation. Theosophy’s lost races of Lemuria and Atlantis, incl. “dragon men” (The Secret Doctrine, 1888), feeding the pulp imagination.
  • Howard -> Doreal -> Icke. Interpretation. “The Shadow Kingdom” (Weird Tales, 1929): serpent men take human form, infiltrate a royal court. Barkun: reaches Maurice Doreal’s Emerald Tablets, then Icke’s Children of the Matrix (2001). Colavito: Icke had many sources, hence dashed.
  • Sitchin -> Icke. Documented. Icke builds openly on Sitchin’s Anunnaki (The 12th Planet, 1976).
  • V -> Icke. Resemblance. 1983 NBC miniseries, reptilian aliens disguised as humans. Often named as an influence; no documented borrowing that I could find.

The plot: a forgery

  • The Protocols -> Cooper. Documented. Behold a Pale Horse (1991) reprints the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, tells readers to substitute “Illuminati” for “Jews”. Publisher later removed the chapter.
  • The Protocols -> Icke. Secondary. Commentators across the spectrum: Icke’s secret-bloodline structure recycles the Protocols.
  • Cooper -> Icke. Secondary. Secret government, alien treaty, Illuminati framing.

When the reptiles were added

  • Bennewitz and Lear -> Branton. Secondary. 1990s, “Branton” (Bruce Alan DeWalton) compiles the Dulce lore in The Dulce Book, proposes reptilian/saurian origins.
  • Branton -> “Thomas Castello”. Unverifiable. Alleged Dulce security officer: humans, reptilians and their Grey workers sharing the base. Q&A annotated by Branton himself; Skeptoid found no evidence he existed.
  • Lear -> Phil Schneider. Resemblance. 1995 lectures, 1979 firefight with aliens at Dulce. Unverifiable.
  • Icke and the same milieu -> the Lacerta Files. Resemblance. 1999 “interview” with a reptilian woman, from a pseudonymous Swede, “Ole K.”. German translator called it a hoax in 2000.
  • Schirmer -> later reptilian readings. Interpretation. Police officer, Ashland, Nebraska, December 1967; under hypnosis recalls a “winged serpent” emblem on the beings’ uniforms. Reptilian reading came later. Hypnotic recall = known confabulation channel (Clancy 2005).

Caveats

So, to sum up the count, about nine apparent sources and three roots, and one of those roots is the government’s own deception. What the graph shows is that the evidence for reptilians doesn’t have an independent channel, which is not the same as proving the claim is false. I’d add two things here. First, the DMT data is a genuinely independent channel of experience: reptilian and serpentine beings show up in about 3% of entity encounters in the Reddit corpus (Lawrence et al. 2022). I think that’s evidence for a reptilian archetype in the human mind, which would also explain why the costume fits so well, but it’s not evidence for beings living under New Mexico. Second, here’s what would change the picture for me: a pre-1979 report of reptilians at an underground facility that can’t be traced to any of these lanes, or any physical trace at all. I looked, and I didn’t find one.


How this was made: the ideas and almost all of the text come from my own recorded dictation, which I then edited. I used Claude Opus 5.5 at high reasoning effort as a research and production assistant to find and check sources, build the models and figures, and help tighten the prose.

QRI Meetup in Mexico City

Hola!

Me da mucho gusto invitarlos al primer evento de Qualia Research Institute (QRI) en México!

Link Del Evento

El evento empieza a las 11AM. Las primeras dos horas son casuales. A la 1PM Andrés, el presidente y co-fundador de la organización, va a dar una presentación con preguntas y respuestas. Luego, de las 2 a las 4PM haremos una actividad tipo “unconference” en donde los participantes pueden proponer temas de qué platicar con otros en grupos pequeños, y finalmente a las 4 pondremos música y baile para quien quiera disfrutar de la compañía de otros qualianautas en México.

Donativo sugerido de $20 dólares/$350 pesos: paypal.me/qualiaRI (dona).

Este donativo sugerido incluye comida vegetariana/vegana, y bebidas sin alcohol ilimitadas. Para recuperar el costo del evento también se les agradecería aportar con un donativo adicional (totalmente opcional).

Se les recomienda traer una “experiencia” para compartir con otros (la “qualia del día”). Ésta puede ser un perfume, una sensación táctil, un poema, un sonido interesante, o lo que se les ocurra.

Contexto:

QRI es una organización no gubernamental que tiene como misión:

1. Desarrollar un lenguaje matemático preciso para describir la experiencia subjetiva.

2. Entender la naturaleza de la valencia emocional (felicidad y sufrimiento).

3. Mapear el espacio completo de las posibles experiencias conscientes.

4. Construir tecnologías para mejorar las vidas de los seres sintientes.

Con este fin, estamos desarrollando modelos matemáticos y psicofísicos para mapear estados exóticos de la conciencia (ej. meditación y psicodélicos), analizando datos empíricos del sistema nervioso con algoritmos novedosos, identificando intervenciones pragmáticas para reducir el sufrimiento intenso, y explicando las condiciones necesarias para que un sistema pueda tener experiencia propia. Si estos temas te interesan, estás en el lugar indicado!

Los invito a aprender lo que hemos desarrollado, conocer a “los otros” en este canal de la mente, y disfrutar de las vibras de la iluminación de la naturaleza de la conciencia para beneficiar a todos los seres sintientes.

Aquí unos links útiles:

Saludos y toda la felicidad! <3

La Torre de La Ingeniería del Paraíso (por Wendy Yan; superhappiness dot xyz)

Collecting Qualia Souvenirs

The Tracer Tool is available here.


Andrew Zuckerman (Zuck) recently presented at IPN’s[1] PsychedelX[2] conference about QRI’s Tracer Tool:

Video description: How can we bring back information from conscious states, especially from exotic and altered states of consciousness? This talk covers Qualia Research Institute’s tracer replication tool and how we can turn what until now has been qualitative descriptions and informal approximations of the psychedelic tracer phenomenon into concrete quantitative replications.

I think that Zuck does a great job at walking you through the features of the tool. If you watch the video you will understand the difference between trails, replays, and strobes. You will get an intuitive feel for what color pulsing means. It will teach you how ADSR envelopes affect tracer effects. And it will give you a sense of how we can use the Tracer Tool to quantify how high you are, how synergistic drugs are, and how valenced a given tracer pattern is. Of course this is explained in the original writeup (linked above), but Zuck’s presentation might be more appropriate if you don’t have the time to read 10,000 words. I recommend it highly.

Qualia Souvenirs

One of the concepts that Zuck introduces in his presentation is that of a qualia souvenir. Just like how it is very nice to bring back a keychain with a picture of the place of your vacation as a souvenir, perhaps we could generalize this notion to include experiences as a whole. That is, how do we create a souvenir for an experience? As Zuck points out, taking a picture while on a psychedelic simply won’t do. You need to capture the quality of your experience, rather than merely the content of the inputs at the time.

With the Tracer Tool (and tools we will be sharing in the future) you can do just that. Well, you can at least replicate a component of your experience. And little by little, as we develop the tools to replicate more and more such components, we will slowly get to the point where you can genuinely recreate a snapshot of your psychedelic experience (or at least to the extent that images and sounds can evoke its nature).

Make It Social

One of the features of the Tracer Tool that I failed to emphasize in the original writeup was that we put a lot of effort into making the submissions shareable. There are several ways you could do this, in fact. The simplest is to fiddle with the parameters until you get an accurate tracer replication and then click on “Start Recording Video” and then click “Stop Recording Video” when you have captured what you want. Then it’s as simple as clicking on “View/Download Video” and then on “Download”. You’ll get a .webm file, which is supported by most large image-sharing sites (e.g gfycat.com). And if you want or need it in a .gif format (e.g. to share it on Facebook), you can use a free online converter.

Alternatively, you can click “Share Parameters” and copy the JSON that is displayed. You can then share it with your friends, who will click on “Import Parameters” and paste the JSON you gave them. The advantage of this method versus the previous one is that you can edit others’ qualia souvenirs and work together to create specific effects. It is also a way for you to “save” your work if you are not quite done and want to continue fiddling with the parameters later on, but don’t want to lose the work you have already put into it.

This is all to say: Make it social! It’s easy! Add tracer replications to your trip reports. Share them in social media. Use them to help your doctor understand the severity of your HPPD. Share them with friends and family (well, maybe not family, lest you want Grandma to know intimate phenomenological details of your LSD trip – there’s every kind of family, you know?). And so on. Let’s normalize psychedelic tracers!

Side-By-Side

A recent improvement to the tool that Zuck mentions in the video is the fact that we now display two bouncing balls rather than just one. This is in order to mitigate the problem that when you are tripping, the simulated tracers will get in the way of the actual tracers. And while this is still a bit of a problem, having one bouncing ball without simulated tracers can be really helpful when fiddling with the parameters on psychedelics:

Side-by-side: left side with tracers, right side without tracers.

We got a trip report from someone who took 100μg LSD who used the tool once we had added the second ball. This person said that the second ball was extremely helpful and that it allowed them to confidently estimate the replay frequency (14.5Hz):

100μg LSD 4 hours after dosing

It’s satisfying to see someone being confident about the replay frequency. The 14.5Hz in this case is not too far off from the 15-20Hz range previously estimated for LSD. And the best part is that this was done during the trip and in real time. The person who submitted this datapoint specifically said that it was very clear that the effect was one of replay rather than strobe, and that they were able to accurately estimate the replay frequency by adjusting the spacing so that there would be a match between the simulated trail effects on the left with the real trail effects on the right. We expect this to be a skill very amenable to training and we hope the psychonautic community starts paying attention to it.

Tracer Tool on Psychedelic YouTube

I recently found a really interesting YouTube channel: Junk Bond Trader (JBT for short). I found it by looking for quality 5-MeO-DMT trip reports and I thought that his video about it was good enough for me to look deeper into his work.

One of the things I really enjoy about his style is that he describes the quality of his altered states in a very matter-of-fact way without taking the experience at face value. He also has a chill demeanor, epistemologically optimistic and curious rather than stuck in a wall of confusion or vibing in mysterianism. This is quite rare in Psychedelic YouTube. Exaggerating a little, I find that psychedelic-adjacent personalities tend to undergo changes that end up being difficult to square with the sort of slow and humble attention to detail needed for science and serious phenomenology. Perhaps we can think of this in terms of archetypes. When someone starts to explore psychedelics they often begin by embodying the archetype of the explorer. Namely, being driven by curiosity about what’s out there in the state-space of consciousness. After a number of powerful experiences, the driving archetype often shifts. The direct exposure to high-energy high-integration states of mind tends to anneal a new self-concept. The archetype they embody tends to drift to things like the psychedelic mystic, priest, educator, messiah, warrior, evangelist, shaman, prophet, counselor, or healer. It is rare to see someone who after many such exposures remains in the explorer wavelength; undoubtedly one of the most useful archetypes for science. In addition to an explorer, JBT is also a synthesizer in that he makes detailed analyses pointing out the common features across many experiences. For instance, I loved his retrospective analysis of about 40 DMT trips (see: part 1, 2, 3, & 4).

Steven Lehar is right, psychedelic experiences are harder to dissect when one is young and impressionable. It is quite likely that the best phenomenological reports will come from people who are at least 30 years old and who have a wealth of crystallized knowledge to use in order to describe their experiences. Speaking of which, I would say that Steven is also someone who successfully maintained the archetype of explorer throughout his psychedelic explorations without lapsing into any other less helpful archetype. But more than that, Lehar is also a synthesizer, and above all a scientist. At QRI we very much value his contributions and, contra modern academia, take seriously the sort of epistemology he employed. Namely, investigating the phenomenal character of (exotic) experiences in order to probe the principles by which perception operates. More generally, the psychedelic archetypes we consider to be priceless for qualia research are those of the explorer, synthesizer, philosopher, scientist, and engineer. Let’s get more of those and less shamans, evangelists, prophets, etc.

Back to JBT, I would highly recommend his Coffee Trip Report video on the basis that… it is really funny. But perhaps most relevant for our purposes at the moment, he recorded a video while on 200μg + 36mg 2C-B (warning: for most people this would be a very strong combined dose) and at 45:40 he started talking about the nature of the tracer effects of this combo:

“These trails are no fucking joke you guys. Some of the coolest visuals I’ve ever had in my life. […] Can I see through my eyelids? I can see around me, what the fuck? Dude, that’s freaking me out. [Waves hand in front of face with eyes closed]. There it is again! Wow. How does that work? […] These visuals are awesome, you’ll have to take my word for it. […] Everything looks alive, you know? It is not so much morphy as with mushrooms, but everything is jumpy, it’s got an energy to it. It’s all pulsing at the same frequency. These trails are… they honestly last two or three seconds. It’s not even funny at this point. It’s ridiculous. I thought I knew trails… I thought I knew trails! I didn’t know fucking trails. I’m afraid to do this again. I was seeing through my eyelids earlier… I’ve gotta look back at that footage. I mean, I obviously wasn’t looking through my eyelids, I know that. But I thought I was, I thought I was, I was that convinced. It’s weird, you go in and out of confusion, and it coincides with the intensity of the hallucinations. It’s like the more confused I get, the more intense the visuals get. So just when things start going good I can’t articulate it. I’m very conscious and lucid during all of this experience, and I’ll be able to recall it all. […] These trails are so over the top. Every little movement stains the air forever. […] Really weird, really strong visuals. Everything looks alive. Which is really cool. I feel like my ceiling is wet. That popcorn ceiling looks wet. It has this weird gloss over it. It looks cool. What can I say, it looks awesome. I could sit here all night staring at my fucking ceiling.”

Given these comments about the trail effects he was experiencing I decided to reach out to him to congratulate him for the quality psychedelic content and also ask him if he would be kind enough to try to replicate the tracers he saw using the Tracer Tool. And he did! He can now share with us a qualia souvenir from his trip! Here is what the tracers looked like:

He left this comment on the submission: “Though it was 5 weeks later, I made a specific note of the tracers in a live trip report video, and committed it to memory at that point because they were so unusually vivid. I chose black because the trail was specifically dark black.” – Junk Bond Trader (see the parameters[3]).

Just a few days ago, JBT gave a shoutout to QRI, my channel, and the Tracer Tool in a video (between 2:35 and 5:20). Thank you JBT! I particularly liked that he remarks on the fact that we use Shia LaBeouf’s “Just Do It!” green screen as the default animation for our custom tracer editor.[4]

Just Do It! Make Your Dreams Come True! (Remix) – with JBT’s Qualia Souvenir Tracers

An important note is that in his shoutout JBT makes it sound like this is all just me, but in reality what is going on at QRI is a huge team effort. In the psychophysics front in particular I would like to mention that Lawrence Wu and Zuck are the main people pushing the envelope and I am immensely grateful for all the hard work they are doing for this project. This also wouldn’t be possible without the many discussions with people at QRI and the broader community of friends of the organization.

I believe that Adeptus Psychonautica, whom I also like and respect, will give the Tracer Tool a try and discuss it in his channel soon! He interviewed me over a year ago and I think that he is also very much of an explorer. A particularly nice thing about his channel is that he reviews psychedelic retreat and healing centers. This is unusual; most people find it psychologically difficult to say anything bad about the place or the people who facilitated an e.g. ayahuasca ceremony for them. The perceived sacredness of the ritual makes any review other than a glowing recommendation feel sacrilegious. Adeptus Psychonautica has been around the psychedelic retreat block enough that he can really map out all the ways in which specific psychedelic retreat centers fail to meet their full potential. This is highly appreciated. I personally would take my sweet time in selecting the right place to experience something as valenced as an ayahuasca trip, so his reviews add a lot of value on that front. Thank you Adeptus!

Akin to these two YouTubers, if you have the ability to promote the Tracer Tool to audiences that are likely to try it, please be our guest! We would love to get more data so we can share the results with the world.

From Psychedelic Renaissance to Psychedelic Enlightenment

One of the things that I love about the fact that JBT tried the tool and talked about it on his channel is that it shows that research feedback loops can be closed online and in places as distracted and unfocused as YouTube. It hints at a new possible model for decentralized scientific research of exotic states of consciousness. Even if small in percentage, a dedicated group of online rational psychonauts able and willing to try each other’s experiments and discuss them openly might very well accelerate our understanding of these states at a pace that is faster than academia or the R&D departments of relevant industries (such as pharma). How many potential Steven Lehars are out there just waiting for the right legal landscape to share their experiences and analyses with others alike? I am excited to see how the online rational psychonautic community evolves in the coming years. I anticipate substantial paradigmatic developments, and we hope that QRI contributes to this process. In the long term, it is still unclear where most of the discoveries in this field will take place. On one extreme a hyper-centralized Manhattan Project of Consciousness could leapfrog all current research, and on the other extreme we have anonymous and decentralized Psychedelic Turk scenarios where access to exotic states of mind (both from the inside and the outside) is a sort of utility at the mercy of market forces. In the middle, perhaps we have semi-decentralized conglomerates of researchers building on each other’s work. If so, I look forward to an emergent science-oriented psychedelic intelligentsia of excellent trip reporters on YouTube in the next few years.

What Data Are We Most Interested In?

The combinatorial space of possible drug cocktails is really large and poorly mapped out. Of particular note, however, is the exotic effects caused by mixing psychedelics and dissociatives. Given the reports that there is a profound synergy between psychedelics and dissociatives (and that this combination is not generally particularly unsafe), we expect there to be really interesting tracers to report and we have no submissions of the sort so far. In particular, we expect to find synergy (rather than orthogonality or suppression) between these classes of drugs, and we would love to quantify the extent of this synergy (anecdotally it is really strong). If you are the sort of person who does not get noticeable tracers on LSD, perhaps try adding a little ketamine and see if that helps. Chances are, you will be like JBT, saying something along the lines of “I thought I knew tracers… I didn’t know **** tracers!”.

It would also be really good to see tracer data for candy-flipping (and MDMA combinations more broadly). We suspect that MDMA will generally have interesting ADSR envelopes. So if you have candy-flipped in the past or you intend do to so in the future please consider donating a couple minutes of your time to submit a datapoint! Remember, you can share it with your friends as a qualia souvenir!

Finally, we would love to have more DMT and 5-MeO-DMT submissions. We are interested in checking if the differences we have found between them can be replicated. In particular, we are told that 5-MeO-DMT produces monochromatic tracers whereas DMT produces richly-colored tracers that flicker between positive and negative after-images. If this turns out to be true, it would be really significant from a scientific point of view:

Apropos Psychedelic YouTube

With over a quarter million views as of March of 2021, The Hyperbolic Geometry of DMT Experiences (@Harvard Science of Psychedelics Club) is perhaps the most viewed piece of QRI content. Thus, the comment section perhaps gives us a snapshot of how the existing (pre-Galilean!) memes surrounding the psychedelic community make sense of this work. Doing a cursory semantic clustering analysis, I would say that most of the comments tend to fit into one of the following groups:

  1. Comments from people who admit to having tried DMT tend to say that “this is the best description of DMT phenomenology I have ever seen”.
  2. Comments complaining about the poor audio quality.
  3. Comments saying I should go on Joe Rogan (e.g. “Very captivating and well formulated. We need to have jamie pull this up.” is the most upvoted comment, with 1.7K upvotes).
  4. Comments stating that the DMT entities are real and that I should take higher doses to confirm that.
  5. Comments complaining that “visuals are not what matters about the experience” and that I’m “missing the point” for paying attention to them.
  6. Weird miscellaneous comments like claiming that the video is a proof that there is a conspiracy from Harvard trying to convince the world that DMT is not a true spiritual molecule.
  7. Fun one-liners (my favorite is “Massachusetts Institute of Tryptamines”).

Let me briefly comment on each of these clusters:

For (1): I am always happy to hear from psychonauts that our work at QRI is clarifying and illuminating. I get a lot of emails and messages saying this, and it honestly makes me happy and keeps me motivated to go on. An example of this would be one of the most upvoted comments:

This video combined with the article probably explained more of the dmt trip than all the trip reports I’ve read which is a lot. The levels, with the doses! Now I know I landed squarely in the Magic Eye. The symmetry hotel is a great explanation too. I find it interesting that I had an experience of divine consciousness on level three rather than level six; perhaps it was just a foretaste? Truly informative, this is what psychonauts need to hear.


YouTube user johnnysandiegoable

For (2): Yes, we know, sorry! We did what we could to stitch together the audio from my phone and the audio from the camera (which was way in the back). The wireless mic we had planned to use malfunctioned at the last minute and I wasn’t very mindful about the fact that the phone would produce the best audio. I know I should have stayed closer to the podium for most of the talk. That said, if you hear the presentation with headphones and are willing to increase the volume for the quiet parts, you can still make out every word. So, admittedly, the comments are exaggerating a bit just how unlistenable it is. ^_^

For (3): Joe, if you are reading this, I’m game! Bring it on! I think that it is entirely possible that we will have a great conversation.

For (4): I have indeed said before that we think it is unlikely that one makes true contact with mind-independent entities while tripping on DMT. Of course we welcome evidence to the contrary, and we have even suggested novel methods by which this could be tested. But I do want to say that unlike other accounts of the DMT phenomenology, the way we argue for the likely internal (“fully in your head”) interpretation does not in any way dismiss the specific reasons why such experiences are so compelling. It is not only that the experience feels very real (indeed, what does that even mean?) but that it has a series of properties that makes the hallucinations stand out as uniquely believable relative to other psychedelics. In the Harvard presentation I mention the idea that the dimensionality of the experience is so high that in a way one does experience a sort of superintelligence while on DMT. In such states, we genuinely get to experience much more information at once and render intricate connections in ways that would make connoisseurs of complex thoughts extremely jealous. Alas, this has yet to be fine-tuned for any kind of useful computational purpose. Yet, in terms of raw information bandwidth, the state has tremendous potential. So we could say, that on DMT you do get to experience a sort of higher intelligence; it is just that it is a higher intelligence of your own making, and we lack an adequate narrative within sober states of mind to make sense of what this experience means. Hence we tend to converge on easy-to-explain and relatable metaphors. Saying that one met with an advanced alien intelligence is somehow easier to convey than describing in detail the sequence of point-of-view fragmentation operations that bootstrapped the multi-perspectival state of mind you experienced. More so, in a recent video, I explained that DMT has some additional properties that make the hallucinations it induces extremely believable. Of particular note I point out that on DMT one experiences:

  • Multi-modal coherence where touch, sight, and sound hallucinations are synchronized,
  • An extremely high temperature parameter leading to the melting of the phenomenal self, and
  • Tactile hallucinations, which add a layer of “reality” to the experience.

These and other features are the reason why DMT experiences feel so “real” and hard to dismiss as mere hallucinations. Rational psychonauts are advised to pay close attention to this in order to avoid developing delusions with repeated administrations.

For (5): Look, we understand. It is obviously the case that the visual effects are a tiny component of the experience, but consider just how difficult it is going to be to describe every single aspect of the experience. I am sure you have heard the expression “learn to walk before you learn to run” (or in this case, learn to walk before you learn to fly, or perhaps more appropriately, to learn to walk before you learn how to operate an alien spaceship with sixteen thousand levers interlinked in unknown ways). In brief, the path that will take us to the point where we can fully characterize a DMT trip will start with developing an extremely crisp and precise vocabulary and research methodology to describe the simplest low-level effects. It is surprising how much we can in fact say about a DMT trip by allusions to attractors in feedback systems and hyperbolic symmetry groups even if this turns out to only get at a small fraction of what makes such experiences interesting. We have to start with the basics; that is what we are doing here.

For (6): This is at least somewhat expected. Recall that DMT tends to make you overfit data. Conspiratorial thinking is a classic form of overfitting. Without a rational framework and grounding exercises, DMT users will generally develop increasingly overfit models of reality.

For (7): Well, keep them coming!

Future Developments

I want to conclude by mentioning that we have ambitious plans for QRI’s Psychophysics Toolkit (of which the Tracer Tool is but the first of many tools to come). We are in the process of developing many more experimental tools and paradigms specifically designed to rigorously quantify and characterize the information-processing features of exotic states of mind. Fancifully, imagine an “experience editor” where you can recreate arbitrary experiences from first principles. To name one possibility here, consider Distill’s Self-Organizing Textures: visual textures are hard to put into words, but easy to tell apart. Hence, odd-one-out paradigms in conjunction with generative methods (i.e. texture synthesis) can allow us to pin-point exactly how psychedelics affect our perception of mongrels. In the long run, we want to characterize the circuit motifs emergent out of the neural architecture of the human brain, and we expect this work to be extremely useful for that pursuit. Stay tuned!


[1] From their website: The Intercollegiate Psychedelics Network (IPN) is a youth-led garden organization dedicated to the development of students into the next generation of diverse and interdisciplinary leaders in the field of psychedelics. We envision a future where safe, legal, and equitable access to psychedelic healing creates a more just, peaceful and connected world. [e.g. see PennPsychedelics].

[2] From their website: PsychedelX is a student talk program featuring 20 minute talks from students around the globe with novel, impactful, and interdisciplinary ideas that will shake up the psychedelic discourse. From February 22nd – 27th [2021], watch their presentations on YouTube to expand your understanding of psychedelics and their role in our world today.

[3] If you want to see Junk Bond Trader’s tracer go to the Tracer Tool, click “Import Paramters”, and then paste: {“animation”:”unlitBallGravity”,”speed”:”1.65″,”trailOn”:true,”trailIntensity”:”70″,”trailTimeFactor”:”78″,”trailExponential”:true,”strobeOn”:true,”strobeFrequency”:”14.7″,”strobeIntensity”:”83″,”strobeTimeFactor”:”76″,”strobeExponential”:true,”strobeAdsr”:false,”replayOn”:false,”replayFrequency”:”11″,”replayIntensity”:”68″,”replayTimeFactor”:”75″,”replayExponential”:true,”replayAdsr”:false,”pulseOn”:false,”pulseFrequency”:”1.6″,”pulseAmplitude”:”50″,”pulseColor”:false,”pulseColorAmplitude”:”100″,”maxTracers”:”154″,”color”:”#000000″}

[4] Thanks to Lawrence Wu for that.

Pure Land Youtube Hits

Leaked “Greatest Video Hits” from the video-sharing equivalent to Youtube in the servers of the Pure Land of Amitābha Buddha (they were using AWS with bad security):

  1. “60 Seconds to Enlightenment: How to create a thought-form that achieves the 3 stages of emptiness in 1 minute or less.” (this is a little documentary from vimeo star “Buddhamax” and record-holder for enlightening thought-forms as fast as possible from a deluded state all the way to a transcendent state)
  2. “We Are The Mandala, We Are The Form” (a call to Boddhisatvas from all corners of the Mandala to donate some good karma to the relief efforts after a large comet stuck a planet in the equivalent of the Jurassic period for that evolutionary timeline)
  3. “Dance Dance Blast Blast” (this is a short that shows a thriller/comedy about Mandila, a soul-based Deva world 2 levels below Pure Lands where a little soul finds out it has a strange innate talent to make music-taste thought-forms and uses them to decode the structure of its world and hack its way out of it Matrix-style)

The Purple Pill

It finally arrived. I had to appeal it’s denial a couple times, but it finally came through. It arrived in the mail today. It’s laminated with rounded corners, a holographic mark, and a pinch of glitter. I finally got my Poetic License. They said if I wanted permission to use metaphors I would need to apply for an allegorical diploma, but what is a poetic license without metaphor? In practice most licensed professionals in the field ignore this rule. It’s not like the reader ever asks you for your credentials whenever symbolism is used. They said my trope copyright agreement is on the way. They gave me a tracking number. But I’m not going to be waiting around any longer…

The most insidious thing about taking the blue pill is that it is usually followed by an immediate amnesia of having done so. Soon after one is presented with the same decision, but now with an incredible -unbelievable- literary feeling of empowerment and bravery that makes you decide to take the red pill in an heroic act of self-effacement. Alas, this is of course all a fantasy induced by the original blue pill.

There are various grades of pseudo-red pills. You have the standard sedatives that put you to sleep; a dreamless coma – “Life is an unprofitable episode disturbing the blessed calm of non-existence” (Schopenhauer). You have the one that makes you forget -in fact achieve a state of convenient social neglect- of the intensely bad experiences that exist out there in Hell branches of the multiverse. There is the one that makes you believe that nonhuman animals lack souls and are unable to suffer (despite their, it turns out, much greater capacity for suffering than humans). There are those that by virtue of making you believe that you took the red pill give your life a tremendous sense of mission and moral superiority. There is the pill of sentimentalism, the pill of fanaticism, the pill of scientism, the pill of mainstream sports, the pill of social media rage, the pill of analytic philosophy fandom, and the pill of pop psychopharmachology (SSRIs increase your serotonin levels, and serotonin is the happy molecule, or so the scientists are saying *wink*). Alas, naming the most common ones, those that zombify the people who claim to be the most awake would feel like a personal attack (even if far from it). So the most common blue pills shall remain unmentioned lest I’m lynched.

The true red pill is not just DXM with red 2. It isn’t just eugenics, international conspiracies, evolutionary psychopathology, or Hansonian signaling theory. The real red pill is made of 4000°C bright red luminous magma that destroys not only your esophagus, but cuts through your body and falls directly on the ground below passing right through, only barely cooled down by your body due to its incredibly high specific heat capacity.

No. That’s still another blue pill fantasy designed to make you feel brave and morally superior for taking it. The real red pill is agape. The communion with the Godhead in its infinite compassion for all Beings large and small.

But you guessed it right, that’s also another type of coating for the blue fellow (iridescent, yes, but still synthetic and bad for your liver).

What did you think, that there is any real closure? It is not like nature is going to be kind to us humans who suffer from high levels of neuroticism and psychological need for closure.

There is no red pill. But there are decent approximations. There is the unprejudiced pursuit of truth – the high AQ high IQ depressive realism that is an evolutionary spandrel. The state of metta and LSD ego death are close seconds, though they lack the critical clarity of mind needed to be willing to stare at the raw truth of suffering and its causes for too long before craving social validation for doing so.

Is there an alternative? Yes.

The purple pill is the pill that gives you both high hedonic tone and an unprejudiced open ended approach to the pursuit of truth. For losing truth is to lose it all, but to lose it all is only bad because it makes you and others suffer in the wider universe. Yes, here is where I am abusing my poetic license. I am a licensed wordsmith, don’t you know? I carry with me the approval of RA, I have the blessing of poetic authority so don’t you dare question my use of vagueness to drive a point home. The purple pill is what will redeem us all. The recognition that though truth is painful in our current, evolutionarily adaptive mind-frame, it is not in and of itself a cause of seething pain. Recognizing that true evil is not a person or a mythical archetype but the mere existence of states of consciousness as pornographically unethical as kidney stones or cluster headaches does not need to induce (at least not logically, not physically) a nihilistic depression. It does not need to make you speak in tongues, to scream at strangers in the street “AHH don’t you see how bad it is that we live in an eternalist empty individualist universe that does not care about the welfare of moments of experience!?!?” – It is still possible to do something productive instead. You can still, it turns out, choose to take eros and agape and reforge them into a laser sword that produces hyperdopaminergic loving-kindness in those who are hit by it, and mindfulness in those who wield it.

The purple pill is the true red pill; at least the best approximation there is. For if the truth is that the world is tenselessly (timelessly) littered with hellish states of consciousness implicated by the universal wavefunction satisfying the principles of zero ontology, this still does not imply that accurately representing the causal structure of such facts *has* to come along with a hellish hedonic tone of itself. This is the truth we all long for.

Take the purple pill and join us in the battle to destroy hell. You will, much to everyone’s incredulous amazement, be happy while doing so.


Photo credit: The HyperSpace

Thoughts on the ‘Is-Ought Problem’ from a Qualia Realist Point of View

tl;dr If we construct a theory of meaning grounded in qualia and felt-sense, it is possible to congruently arrive at “should” statements on the basis of reason and “is” claims. Meaning grounded in qualia allows us to import the pleasure-pain axis and its phenomenal character to the same plane of discussion as factual and structural observations.

Introduction

The Is-Ought problem (also called “Hume’s guillotine”) is a classical philosophical conundrum. On the one hand people feel that our ethical obligations (at least the uncontroversial ones like “do not torture anyone for no reason”) are facts about reality in some important sense, but on the other hand, rigorously deriving such “moral facts” from facts about the universe appears to be a category error. Is there any physical fact that truly compels us to act in one way or another?

A friend recently asked about my thoughts on this question and I took the time to express them to the best of my knowledge.

Takeaways

I provide seven points of discussion that together can be used to make the case that “ought” judgements often, though not always, are on the same ontological footing as “is” claims. Namely, that they are references to the structure and quality of experience, whose ultimate nature is self-intimating (i.e. it reveals itself) and hence inaccessible to those who lack the physiological apparatus to instantiate it. In turn, we could say that within communities of beings who share the same self-intimating qualities of experience, the is/ought divide may not be completely unbridgeable.


Summaries of Question and Response

Summary of the question:

How does a “should” emerge at all? How can reason and/or principles and/or logic compel us to follow some moral code?

Summary of the response:

  1. If “ought” statements are to be part of our worldview, then they must refer to decisions about experiences: what kinds of experiences are better/worse, what experiences should or should not exist, etc.
  2. A shared sense of personal identity (e.g. Open Individualism – which posits that “we are all one consciousness”) allows us to make parallels between the quality of our experience and the experience of others. Hence if one grounds “oughts” on the self-intimating quality of one’s suffering, then we can also extrapolate that such “oughts” must exist in the experience of other sentient beings and that they are no less real “over there” simply because a different brain is generating them (general relativity shows that every “here and now” is equally real).
  3. Reduction cuts both ways: if the “fire in the equations of physics” can feel a certain way (e.g. bliss/pain) then objective causal descriptions of reality (about e.g. brain states) are implicitly referring to precisely that which has an “ought” quality. Thus physics may be inextricably connected with moral “oughts”.
  4. If one loses sight of the fact that one’s experience is the ultimate referent for meaning, it is possible to end up in nihilistic accounts of meaning (e.g. such as Quine’s Indeterminacy of translation and Dennett’s inclusion of qualia within that framework). But if one grounds meaning in qualia, then suddenly both causality and value are on the same ontological footing (cf. Valence Realism).
  5. To see clearly the nature of value it is best to examine it at its extremes (such as MDMA bliss vs. the pain of kidney stones). Having such experiences illuminates the “ought” aspect of consciousness, in contrast to the typical quasi-anhedonic “normal everyday states of consciousness” that most people (and philosophers!) tend to reason from. It would be interesting to see philosophers discuss e.g. the Is-Ought problem while on MDMA.
  6. Claims that “pleasure and pain, value and disvalue, good and bad, etc.” are an illusion by long-term meditators based on the experience of “dissolving value” in meditative states are no more valid than claims that pain is an illusion by someone doped on morphine. In brief: such claims are made in a state of consciousness that has lost touch with the actual quality of experience that gives (dis)value to consciousness.
  7. Admittedly the idea that one state of consciousness can even refer to (let alone make value judgements about) other states of consciousness is very problematic. In what sense does “reference” even make sense? Every moment of experience only has access to its own content. We posit that this problem is not ultimately unsolvable, and that human concepts are currently mere prototypes of a much better future set of varieties of consciousness optimized for truth-finding. As a thought experiment to illustrate this possible future, consider a full-spectrum superintelligence capable of instantiating arbitrary modes of experience and impartially comparing them side by side in order to build a total order of consciousness.

Full Question and Response

Question:

I realized I don’t share some fundamental assumptions that seemed common amongst the people here [referring to the Qualia Research Institute and friends].

The most basic way I know how to phrase it, is the notion that there’s some appeal to reason and/or principles and/or logic that compels us to follow some type of moral code.

A (possibly straw-man) instance is the notion I associate with effective altruism, namely, that one should choose a career based on its calculable contribution to human welfare. The assumption is that human welfare is what we “should” care about. Why should we? What’s compelling about trying to reconfigure ourselves from whatever we value at the moment to replacing that thing with human welfare (or anything else)? What makes us think we can even truly succeed in reconfiguring ourselves like this? The obvious pitfall seems to be we create some image of “goodness” that we try to live up to without ever being honest with ourselves and owning our authentic desires. IMO this issue is rampant in mainstream Christianity.

More generally, I don’t understand how a “should” emerges within moral philosophy at all. I understand how starting with a want, say happiness, and noting a general tendency, such as I become happy when I help others, that one could deduce that helping others often is likely to result in a happy life. I might even say “I should help others” to myself, knowing it’s a strategy to get what I want. That’s not the type of “should” I’m talking about. What I’m talking about is “should” at the most basic level of one’s value structure. I don’t understand how any amount of reasoning could tell us what our most basic values and desires “should” be.

I would like to read something rigorous on this issue. I appreciate any references, as well as any elucidating replies.

Response:

This is a very important topic. I think it is great that you raise this question, as it stands at the core of many debates and arguments about ethics and morality. I think that one can indeed make a really strong case for the view that “ought” is simply never logically implied by any accurate and objective description of the world (the famous is/ought Humean guillotine). I understand that an objective assessment of all that is will usually be cast as a network of causal and structural relationships. By starting out with a network of causal and structural relationships and using logical inferences to arrive at further high-level facts, one is ultimately bound to arrive at conclusions that themselves are just structural and causal relationships. So where does the “ought” fit in here? Is it really just a manner of speaking? A linguistic spandrel that emerges from evolutionary history? It could really seem like it, and I admit that I do not have a silver bullet argument against this view.

However, I do think that eventually we will arrive at a post-Galilean understanding of consciousness, and that this understanding will itself allow us to point out exactly where- if at all- ethical imperatives are located and how they emerge. For now all I have is a series of observations that I hope can help you develop an intuition for how we are thinking about it, and why our take is original and novel (and not simply a rehashing of previous arguments or appeals to nature/intuition/guilt).

So without further ado I would like to lay out the following points on the table:

  1. I am of the mind that if any kind of “ought” is present in reality it will involve decision-making about the quality of consciousness of subjects of experience. I do not think that it makes sense to talk about an ethical imperative that has anything to do with non-experiential properties of the universe precisely because there would be no one affected by it. If there is an argument for caring about things that have no impact on any state of consciousness, I have yet to encounter it. So I will assume that the question refers to whether certain states of consciousness ought to or ought not to exist (and how to make trade offs between them).
  2. I also think that personal identity is key for this discussion, but why this is the case will make sense in a moment. The short answer is that conscious value is self-intimating/self-revealing, and in order to pass judgement on something that you yourself (as a narrative being) will not get to experience you need some confidence (or reasonable cause) to believe that the same self-intimating quality of experience is present in other narrative orbits that will not interact with you. For the same reasons as (1) above, it makes no sense to care about philosophical zombies (no matter how much they scream at you), but the same is the case for “conscious value p. zombies” (where maybe they experience color qualia but do not experience hedonic tone i.e. they can’t suffer).
  3. A very important concept that comes up again and again in our research is the notion that “reduction cuts both ways”. We take dual aspect monism seriously, and in this view we would consider the mathematical description of an experience and its qualia two sides of the same coin. Now, many people come here and say “the moment you reduce an experience of bliss to a mathematical equation you have removed any fuzzy morality from it and arrived at a purely objective and factual account which does not support an ‘ought ontology'”. But doing this mental move requires you to take the mathematical account as a superior ontology to that of the self-intimating quality of experience. In our view, these are two sides of the same coin. If mystical experiences are just a bunch of chemicals, then a bunch of chemicals can also be a mystical experience. To reiterate: reduction cuts both ways, and this happens with the value of experience to the same extent as it happens with the qualia of e.g. red or cinnamon.
  4. Mike Johnson tends to bring up Wittgenstein and Quine to the “Is-Ought” problem because they are famous for ‘reducing language and meaning’ to games and networks of relationships. But here you should realize that you can apply the concept developed in (3) above just as well to this matter. In our view, a view of language that has “words and objects” at its foundation is not a complete ontology, and nor is one that merely introduces language games to dissolve the mystery of meaning. What’s missing here is “felt sense” – the raw way in which concepts feel and operate on each other whether or not they are verbalized. It is my view that here phenomenal binding becomes critical because a felt sense that corresponds to a word, concept, referent, etc. in itself encapsulates a large amount of information simultaneously, and contains many invariants across a set of possible mental transformations that define what it is and what it is not. More so, felt senses are computationally powerful (rather than merely epiphenomenal). Consider Daniel Tammet‘s mathematical feats achieved by experiencing numbers in complex synesthetic ways that interact with each other in ways that are isomorphic to multiplication, factorization, etc. More so, he does this at competitive speeds. Language, in a sense, could be thought of as the surface of felt sense. Daniel Dennett famously argued that you can “Quine Qualia” (meaning that you can explain it away with a groundless network of relationships and referents). We, on the opposite extreme, would bite the bullet of meaning and say that meaning itself is grounded in felt-sense and qualia. Thus, colors, aromas, emotions, and thoughts, rather than being ultimately semantically groundless as Dennett would have it, turn out to be the very foundation of meaning.
  5. In light of the above, let’s consider some experiences that embody the strongest degree of the felt sense of “ought to be” and “ought not to be” that we know of. On the negative side, we have things like cluster headaches and kidney stones. On the positive side we have things like Samadhi, MDMA, and 5-MEO-DMT states of consciousness. I am personally more certain that the “ought not to be” aspect of experience is more real than the “ought to be” aspect of it, which is why I have a tendency (though no strong commitment) towards negative utilitarianism. When you touch a hot stove you get this involuntary reaction and associated valence qualia of “reality needs you to recoil from this”, and in such cases one has degrees of freedom into which to back off. But when experiencing cluster headaches and kidney stones, this sensation- that self-intimating felt-sense of ‘this ought not to be’- is omnidirectional. The experience is one in which one feels like every direction is negative, and in turn, at its extremes, one feels spiritually violated (“a major ethical emergency” is how a sufferer of cluster headaches recently described it to me). This brings me to…
  6. The apparent illusory nature of value in light of meditative deconstruction of felt-senses. As you put it elsewhere: “Introspectively – Meditators with deep experience typically report all concepts are delusion. This is realized in a very direct experiential way.” Here I am ambivalent, though my default response is to make sense of the meditation-induced feeling that “value is illusory” as itself an operation on one’s conscious topology that makes the value quality of experience get diminished or plugged out. Meditation masters will say things like “if you observe the pain very carefully, if you slice it into 30 tiny fragments per second, you will realize that the suffering you experience from it is an illusory construction”. And this kind of language itself is, IMO, liable to give off the illusion that the pain was illusory to begin with. But here I disagree. We don’t say that people who take a strong opioid to reduce acute pain are “gaining insight into the fundamental nature of pain” and that’s “why they stop experiencing it”. Rather, we understand that the strong opioid changes the neurological conditions in such a way that the quality of the pain itself is modified, which results in a duller, “asymbolic“, non-propagating, well-confined discomfort. In other words, strong opioids reduce the value-quality of pain by locally changing the nature of pain rather than by bringing about a realization of its ultimate nature. The same with meditation. The strongest difference here, I think, would be that opioids are preventing the spatial propagation of pain “symmetry breaking structures” across one’s experience and thus “confine pain to a small spatial location”, whereas meditation does something different that is better described as confining the pain to a small temporal region. This is hard to explain in full, and it will require us to fully formalize how the subjective arrow of time is constructed and how pain qualia can make copies across it. [By noting the pain very quickly one is, I believe, preventing it from building up and then having “secondary pain” which emerges from the cymatic resonance of the various lingering echoes of pain across one’s entire “pseudo-time arrow of experience”.] Sorry if this sounds like word salad, I am happy to unpack these concepts if needed, while also admitting that we are in early stages of the theoretical and empirical development.
  7. Finally, I will concede that the common sense view of “reference” is very deluded on many levels. The very notion that we can refer to an experience with another experience, that we can encode the properties of a different moment of experience in one’s current moment of experience, that we can talk about the “real world” or its “objective ethical values” or “moral duty” is very far from sensical in the final analysis. Reference is very tricky, and I think that a full understanding of consciousness will do some severe violence to our common sense in this area. That, however, is different from the self-disclosing properties of experience such as red qualia and pain qualia. You can do away with all of common sense reference while retaining a grounded understanding that “the constituents of the world are qualia values and their local binding relationships”. In turn, I do think that we can aim to do a decently good job at re-building from the ground up a good approximation of our common sense understanding of the world using “meaning grounded in qualia”, and once we do that we will be in a solid foundation (as opposed to the, admittedly very messy, quasi-delusional character of thoughts as they exist today). Needless to say, this may also need us to change our state of consciousness. “Someday we will have thoughts like sunsets” – David Pearce.

 

Why don’t more effective altruists work on the Hedonistic Imperative?

By David Pearce (in response to a Quora question)

 

Life could be wonderful. Genetically phasing out suffering in favour of hardwired happiness ought to be mainstream. Today, it’s a fringe view. It’s worth asking why.

Perhaps the first scientifically-literate blueprint for a world without suffering was written by Lewis Mancini. “Brain stimulation and the genetic engineering of a world without pain” was published in the journal Medical Hypotheses in 1990. As far as I can tell, the paper sunk almost without a trace. Ignorant of Mancini’s work, I wrote The Hedonistic Imperative (HI) in 1995. I’ve plugged away at the theme ever since. Currently, a small, scattered minority of researchers believe that replacing the biology of suffering with gradients of genetically preprogrammed well-being is not just ethical but obviously so.

Alas, perceptions of obviousness vary. Technically, at least, the abolitionist project can no longer easily be dismissed as science fiction. The twenty-first century has already witnessed the decoding of the human genome, the development and imminent commercialisation of in vitro meat, the dawn of CRISPR genome-editing and the promise of synthetic gene drives. Identification of alleles and allelic combinations governing everything from pain-sensitivity to hedonic range and hedonic set-points is complementing traditional twin studies. The high genetic loading of subjective well-being and mental ill-health is being deciphered. The purely technical arguments against the genetic feasibility of creating a happy living world are shrinking. But genetic status quo bias is deeply entrenched. The sociopolitical obstacles to reprogramming the biosphere are daunting.

You ask specifically about effective altruists (EAs). Some effective altruists (cf. Effective Altruism: How Can We Best Help Others? by Magnus Vinding) do explore biological-genetic solutions to complement socio-economic reform and other environmental interventions. Most don’t. Indeed, a significant minority of EAs expressly urge a nonbiological focus for EA. For example, see Why I Don’t Focus On The Hedonistic Imperative by the influential EA Brian Tomasik. I can’t offer a complete explanation, but I think these facts are relevant:

1) Timescales. Lewis Mancini reckons that completion of the abolitionist project will take thousands of years. HI predicts that the world’s last unpleasant experience will occur a few centuries hence, perhaps in some obscure marine invertebrate. If, fancifully, consensus existed for a global species-project, then 100 – 150 years (?) might be a credible forecast. Alas, such a timescale is wildly unrealistic. No such consensus exists or is plausibly in prospect. For sure, ask people a question framed on the lines of “Do you agree with Gautama Buddha, ‘May all that have life be delivered from suffering’?” and assent might be quite high. Some kind of quantified, cross-cultural study of radical Buddhist or Benthamite abolitionism would be interesting. Yet most people balk at what the scientific implementation of such a vision practically entails – if they reflect on abolitionist bioethics at all. “That’s just Brave New World” is a common response among educated Westerners to the idea of engineering “unnatural” well-being. Typically, EAs are focused on measurable results in foreseeable timeframes in areas where consensus is broad and deep, for instance the elimination of vector-borne disease. Almost everyone agrees that eliminating malaria will make the world a better place. Malaria can be eradicated this century.

2) The Hedonic Treadmill. In recent decades, popular awareness of the hedonic treadmill has grown. Sadly, most nonbiological interventions to improve well-being may not have the dramatic long-term impact we naïvely hope. However, awareness of the genetic underpinnings of the hedonic treadmill is sketchy. Knowledge of specific interventions we can plan to subvert its negative feedback mechanisms is sketchier still. Compared to more gross and visible ills, talk of “low hedonic set-points” (etc) is nebulous. Be honest, which would you personally choose if offered: a vast national lottery win (cf. How Winning The Lottery Affects Happiness) or a modestly higher hedonic set-point? Likewise, the prospect of making everyone on Earth prosperous sounds more effectively altruistic (cf. Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?) than raising their hedonic defaults – even if push-button hedonic uplift were now feasible, which it isn’t, or at least not without socially unacceptable consequences.

3) The Spectre of Eugenics. Any confusion between the racial hygiene policies of the Third Reich and the project of genetically phasing out suffering in all sentient beings ought to be laughable. Nonetheless, many people recoil at the prospect of “designer babies”. Sooner or later, the ”e”-word crops up in discussions of genetic remediation and enhancement. If we assume that bioconservative attitudes to baby-making will prevail worldwide indefinitely, and the reproductive revolution extends at best only to a minority of prospective parents, then the abolitionist project will never happen. What we call the Cambrian Explosion might alternatively be classified as the Suffering Explosion. If we don’t tackle the biological-genetic roots of suffering at source – “eugenics”, if you will – then pain and suffering will proliferate until Doomsday. Without eugenics, the world’s last unpleasant experience may occur millions or even billions of years hence.

4) Core Values. Self-identified effective altruists range from ardent life loversfocused on existential risks, AGI and the hypothetical Intelligence Explosion to radical anti-natalists and negative utilitarians committed to suffering-focused ethics (cf. What are the main differences between the anti-natalism/efilism community and the negative utilitarian/”suffering-focused ethics” wing of the effective altruism community?). There’s no inherent conflict with HI at either extreme. On the one hand, phasing out the biology of suffering can potentially minimise existential risk. Crudely, the more we love life, the more we want to preserve it. On the opposite wing of EA, radical anti-natalists oppose reproduction because they care about suffering, not because of opposition to new babies per se. Technically speaking, CRISPR babies could be little bundles of joy – as distinct from today’s tragic genetic experiments. In practice, however, life-loving EAs are suspicious of (notionally) button-pressing negative utilitarians, whereas radical anti-natalists view worldwide genetic engineering as even more improbable than their preferred option of voluntary human extinction.

5) Organisation and Leadership. Both secular and religious organizations exist whose tenets include the outright abolition of suffering. EAs can and do join such groups. However, sadly, I don’t know of a single organisation dedicated to biological-genetic solutions to the problem of suffering. Among transhumanists, for instance, radical life-extension and the prospect of posthuman superintelligence loom larger than biohappiness – though article 7 of the Transhumanist Declaration is admirably forthright: a commitment to the well-being of all sentience. Also, I think we need star power: the blessing of some charismatic billionaire or larger-than-life media celebrity. “Bill Gates says let’s use biotechnology to phase out the genetic basis of suffering” would be a breakthrough. Or even Justin Bieber.

For my part, I’m just a writer/researcher. We have our place! My guess is that this century will see more blueprints and manifestos and grandiose philosophical proposals together with concrete, incremental progress from real scientists. The genetic basis of suffering will eventually be eradicated across the tree of life, not in the name of anything “hedonistic” or gradients of intelligent bliss, and certainly not in the name of negative utilitarianism, but perhaps under the label of the World Health Organisation’s definition of health (cf. Constitution of WHO: principles). Taken literally, the constitution of the WHO enshrines the most daringly ambitious vision of the future of sentience ever conceived. Lifelong good health (“complete physical, mental and social well-being”) for all sentient beings is a noble aspiration. Regardless of race or species, all of us deserve good health as so defined. A biology of information-sensitive gradients of physical, mental and social well-being (HI) is more modest and workable thanks to biotech. Optimistically, life on Earth has only a few more centuries of misery and malaise to go.

Qualia Computing Media Appearances

Podcasts

16 – Andrés Gómez Emilsson on Solving Consciousness and Being Happy All the Time (The Most Interesting People I Know…, October 2019)

On Consciousness, Qualia, and Meaning with Mike Johnson and Andrés Gómez Emilsson (AI Alignment Podcast, May 2019)

71 – Researching Qualia with Andrés Gómez Emilsson (The Bayesian Conspiracy, October 2018)

The Future of Mind (Waking Cosmos, October 2018)

Consciousness, Qualia, and Psychedelics with Andres Gomez Emilsson (Catalyzing Coherence, May 2018)

Consciousness and Qualia Realism (Cosmic Tortoise, May 2018)

Robert Stark interviews Transhumanist Andres Gomez Emilsson (The Stark Truth with Robert Stark, October 2017)

Como el MDMA, pero sin la neurotoxicidad (Abolir el sufrimiento con Andrés Gómez) (Guía Escéptica [in Spanish], March 2016)

Happiness is Solving the World’s Problems (The World Transformed, January 2016)

Presentations

The Hyperbolic Geometry of DMT Experiences (@Harvard Science of Psychedelics Club, September 2019)

Harmonic Society: 8 Models of Art for a Scientific Paradigm of Aesthetic Qualia (at a QRI Party, July 2019)

Andrés Gómez Emilsson – Consciousness vs Replicators (Burning Man, August 2018)

Quantifying Valence (see also; The Science of Consciousness, April 2018)

Quantifying Bliss (Consciousness Hacking, June 2017)

Utilitarian Temperament: Satisfying Impactful Careers (BIL Oakland 2016: The Recession Generation, July 2016)

Interviews

Mapping the psychedelic experience – a conversation with the Qualia Research Institute (Adeptus Psychonautica, October 2019)

Simulation #453 Catalog & Navigate Consciousness (Simulation, Jun 2019)

Simulation #310 Mike Johnson & Andrés Gómez Emilsson – Chemistry of Consciousness (Simulation, March 2019)

Simulation #255 Andrés Gómez Emilsson – Computational Properties of Consciousness (Simulation, February 2019)

Want a Penfield Mood Organ? This Scientist Might Be Able to Help (Ziff Davis PCMag, April 2018)

Frameworks for Consciousness – Andres Gomez Emilsson (Science, Technology & the Future by Adam Ford, March 2018)

Towards the Abolition of Suffering through Science (featuring David Pearce, Brian Tomasik, & Mike Johnson hosted by Adam Ford, August 2015)

The Mind of David Pearce (Stanford, December 2012)

Andrés Gómez Emilsson, el joven que grito espurio a Felipe Calderón (Cine Desbundo [in Spanish], October 2008)

Narrative Inclusions

SSC Journal Club: Relaxed Beliefs Under Psychedelics and the Anarchic Brain (Slate Star Codex, September 2019)

Why We Need to Study Consciousness (Scientific American, September 2019)

Young pioneers on their hopes for technology, and older trailblazers on their regrets (MIT Technology Review, August 2019)

Mike Johnson – Testable Theories of Consciousness (Science, Technology & the Future, March 2019)

On Consciousness, Qualia, Valence & Intelligence with Mike Johnson (Science, Technology, Future, October 2018)

Podcast with Daniel Ingram (Cosmic Tortoise [referenced at 2h22m], January 2018)

Fear and Loathing at Effective Altruism Global 2017 (Slate Star Codex, August 2017)

Transhumanist Proves Schrödinger’s Cat Experiment Isn’t Better on LSD (Inverse, October 2016)

High Performer: Die Renaissance des LSD im Silicon Valley (Wired Germany [in German], June 2015)

Come With Us If You Want To Live (Harper’s Magazine, January 2015)

David Pearce’s Social Media Posts (Hedweb: pre-2014, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018)

David Pearce at Stanford 2011 (Stanford Transhumanist Association, December 2011)

External Articles

Ending Suffering Is The Most Important Cause (IEET, September 2015)

This Is What I Mean When I Say ‘Consciousness’ (IEET, September 2015)

My Interest Shifted from Mathematics to Consciousness after a THC Experience (IEET, September 2015)

‘Spiritual/Philosophical’ is the Deepest, Highest, Most Powerful Dimension of Euphoria (IEET, September 2015)

Bios

H+pedia, ISI-S, Decentralized AI Summit, Earth Sharing

Miscellaneous

Philosophy of Mind Stand-up Comedy (The Science of Consciousness,  April 2018)

Randal Koene vs. Andres Emilsson on The Binding Problem (Bay Area Futurists, Oakland CA, May 2016)


Note: I am generally outgoing, fun-loving, and happy to participate in podcasts, events, interviews, and miscellaneous activities. Feel free to invite me to your podcast/interview/theater/etc. I am flexible when it comes to content; anything I’ve written about in Qualia Computing is fair game for discussion. Infinite bliss!

What If God Were a Closed Individualist Presentist Hedonistic Utilitarian With an Information-Theoretic Identity of Indiscernibles Ontology?

Extract from “Unsong” (chapter 18):

There’s an old Jewish childrens’ song called Had Gadya. It starts:

A little goat, a little goat
My father bought for two silver coins,
A little goat, a little goat

Then came the cat that ate the goat
My father bought for two silver coins
A little goat, a little goat

Then came that dog that bit the cat…

And so on. A stick hits the dog, a fire burns the stick, water quenches the fire, an ox drinks the water, a butcher slaughters the ox, the Angel of Death takes the butcher, and finally God destroys the Angel of Death. Throughout all of these verses, it is emphasized that it is indeed a little goat, and the father did indeed buy it for two silver coins.

[…]

As far as I know, no one has previously linked this song to the Lurianic Kabbalah. So I will say it: the deepest meaning of Had Gadya is a description of how and why God created the world. As an encore, it also resolves the philosophical problem of evil.

The most prominent Biblical reference to a goat is the scapegoating ritual. Once a year, the High Priest of Israel would get rid of the sins of the Jewish people by mystically transferring all of them onto a goat, then yelling at the goat until it ran off somewhere, presumably taking all the sin with it.

The thing is, at that point the goat contained an entire nation-year worth of sin. That goat was super evil. As a result, many religious and mystical traditions have associated unholy forces with goats ever since, from the goat demon Baphomet to the classical rather goat-like appearance of Satan.

So the goat represents evil. I’ll go along with everyone else saying the father represents God here. So God buys evil with two silver coins. What’s up?

The most famous question in theology is “Why did God create a universe filled with so much that is evil?” The classical answers tend to be kind of weaselly, and center around something like free will or necessary principles or mysterious ways. Something along the lines of “Even though God’s omnipotent, creating a universe without evil just isn’t possible.”

But here we have God buying evil with two silver coins. Buying to me represents an intentional action. Let’s go further – buying represents a sacrifice. Buying is when you sacrifice something dear to you to get something you want even more. Evil isn’t something God couldn’t figure out how to avoid, it’s something He covets.

What did God sacrifice for the sake of evil? Two silver coins. We immediately notice the number “two”. Two is not typically associated with God. God is One. Two is right out. The kabbalists identify the worst demon, the nadir of all demons, as Thamiel, whose name means “duality in God”. Two is dissonance, divorce, division, dilemmas, distance, discrimination, diabolism.

This, then, was God’s sacrifice. In order to create evil, He took up duality.

“Why would God want to create evil? God is pure Good!”

Exactly. The creation of anything at all other than God requires evil. God is perfect. Everything else is imperfect. Imperfection contains evil by definition. Two scoops of evil is the first ingredient in the recipe for creating universes. Finitude is evil. Form is evil. Without evil all you have is God, who, as the kabbalists tell us, is pure Nothing. If you want something, evil is part of the deal.

Now count the number of creatures in the song. God, angel, butcher, ox, water, fire, stick, dog, cat, goat. Ten steps from God to goat. This is the same description of the ten sephirot we’ve found elsewhere, the ten levels by which God’s ineffability connects to the sinful material world without destroying it. This is not a coincidence because nothing is ever a coincidence. Had Gadya isn’t just a silly children’s song about the stages of advancement of the human soul, the appropriate rituals for celebrating Passover in the Temple, the ancient Sumerian pantheon, and the historical conquests of King Tiglath-Pileser III. It’s also a blueprint for the creation of the universe. Just like everything else.


(see also: ANSWER TO JOB)

Why I think the Foundational Research Institute should rethink its approach

by Mike Johnson

The following is my considered evaluation of the Foundational Research Institute, circa July 2017. I discuss its goal, where I foresee things going wrong with how it defines suffering, and what it could do to avoid these problems.

TL;DR version: functionalism (“consciousness is the sum-total of the functional properties of our brains”) sounds a lot better than it actually turns out to be in practice. In particular, functionalism makes it impossible to define ethics & suffering in a way that can mediate disagreements.

I. What is the Foundational Research Institute?

The Foundational Research Institute (FRI) is a Berlin-based group that “conducts research on how to best reduce the suffering of sentient beings in the near and far future.” Executive Director Max Daniel introduced them at EA Global Boston as “the only EA organization which at an organizational level has the mission of focusing on reducing s-risk.” S-risks are, according to Daniel, “risks where an adverse outcome would bring about suffering on an astronomical scale, vastly exceeding all suffering that has existed on Earth so far.”

Essentially, FRI wants to become the research arm of suffering-focused ethics, and help prevent artificial general intelligence (AGI) failure-modes which might produce suffering on a cosmic scale.

What I like about FRI:

While I have serious qualms about FRI’s research framework, I think the people behind FRI deserve a lot of credit- they seem to be serious people, working hard to build something good. In particular, I want to give them a shoutout for three things:

  • First, FRI takes suffering seriously, and I think that’s important. When times are good, we tend to forget how tongue-chewingly horrific suffering can be. S-risks seem particularly horrifying.
  • Second, FRI isn’t afraid of being weird. FRI has been working on s-risk research for a few years now, and if people are starting to come around to the idea that s-risks are worth thinking about, much of the credit goes to FRI.
  • Third, I have great personal respect for Brian Tomasik, one of FRI’s co-founders. I’ve found him highly thoughtful, generous in debates, and unfailingly principled. In particular, he’s always willing to bite the bullet and work ideas out to their logical end, even if it involves repugnant conclusions.

What is FRI’s research framework?

FRI believes in analytic functionalism, or what David Chalmers calls “Type-A materialism”. Essentially, what this means is there’s no ’theoretical essence’ to consciousness; rather, consciousness is the sum-total of the functional properties of our brains. Since ‘functional properties’ are rather vague, this means consciousness itself is rather vague, in the same way words like “life,” “justice,” and “virtue” are messy and vague.

Brian suggests that this vagueness means there’s an inherently subjective, perhaps arbitrary element to how we define consciousness:

Analytic functionalism looks for functional processes in the brain that roughly capture what we mean by words like “awareness”, “happy”, etc., in a similar way as a biologist may look for precise properties of replicators that roughly capture what we mean by “life”. Just as there can be room for fuzziness about where exactly to draw the boundaries around “life”, different analytic functionalists may have different opinions about where to define the boundaries of “consciousness” and other mental states. This is why consciousness is “up to us to define”. There’s no hard problem of consciousness for the same reason there’s no hard problem of life: consciousness is just a high-level word that we use to refer to lots of detailed processes, and it doesn’t mean anything in addition to those processes.

Finally, Brian argues that the phenomenology of consciousness is identical with the phenomenology of computation:

I know that I’m conscious. I also know, from neuroscience combined with Occam’s razor, that my consciousness consists only of material operations in my brain — probably mostly patterns of neuronal firing that help process inputs, compute intermediate ideas, and produce behavioral outputs. Thus, I can see that consciousness is just the first-person view of certain kinds of computations — as Eliezer Yudkowsky puts it, “How An Algorithm Feels From Inside“. Consciousness is not something separate from or epiphenomenal to these computations. It is these computations, just from their own perspective of trying to think about themselves.

 

In other words, consciousness is what minds compute. Consciousness is the collection of input operations, intermediate processing, and output behaviors that an entity performs.

And if consciousness is all these things, so too is suffering. Which means suffering is computational, yet also inherently fuzzy, and at least a bit arbitrary; a leaky high-level reification impossible to speak about accurately, since there’s no formal, objective “ground truth”.

II. Why do I worry about FRI’s research framework?

In short, I think FRI has a worthy goal and good people, but its metaphysics actively prevent making progress toward that goal. The following describes why I think that, drawing heavily on Brian’s writings (of FRI’s researchers, Brian seems the most focused on metaphysics):

Note: FRI is not the only EA organization which holds functionalist views on consciousness; much of the following critique would also apply to e.g. MIRI, FHI, and OpenPhil. I focus on FRI because (1) Brian’s writings on consciousness & functionalism have been hugely influential in the community, and are clear enough *to* criticize; (2) the fact that FRI is particularly clear about what it cares about- suffering- allows a particularly clear critique about what problems it will run into with functionalism; (3) I believe FRI is at the forefront of an important cause area which has not crystallized yet, and I think it’s critically important to get these objections bouncing around this subcommunity.

Objection 1: Motte-and-bailey

Brian: “Consciousness is not a thing which exists ‘out there’ or even a separate property of matter; it’s a definitional category into which we classify minds. ‘Is this digital mind really conscious?’ is analogous to ‘Is a rock that people use to eat on really a table?’ [However,] That consciousness is a cluster in thingspace rather than a concrete property of the world does not make reducing suffering less important.”

The FRI model seems to imply that suffering is ineffable enough such that we can’t have an objective definition, yet sufficiently effable that we can coherently talk and care about it. This attempt to have it both ways seems contradictory, or at least in deep tension.

Indeed, I’d argue that the degree to which you can care about something is proportional to the degree to which you can define it objectively. E.g., If I say that “gnireffus” is literally the most terrible thing in the cosmos, that we should spread gnireffus-focused ethics, and that minimizing g-risks (far-future scenarios which involve large amounts of gnireffus) is a moral imperative, but also that what is and what and isn’t gnireffus is rather subjective with no privileged definition, and it’s impossible to objectively tell if a physical system exhibits gnireffus, you might raise any number of objections. This is not an exact metaphor for FRI’s position, but I worry that FRI’s work leans on the intuition that suffering is real and we can speak coherently about it, to a degree greater than its metaphysics formally allow.

Max Daniel (personal communication) suggests that we’re comfortable with a degree of ineffability in other contexts; “Brian claims that the concept of suffering shares the allegedly problematic properties with the concept of a table. But it seems a stretch to say that the alleged tension is problematic when talking about tables. So why would it be problematic when talking about suffering?” However, if we take the anti-realist view that suffering is ‘merely’ a node in the network of language, we have to live with the consequences of this: that ‘suffering’ will lose meaning as we take it away from the network in which it’s embedded (Wittgenstein). But FRI wants to do exactly this, to speak about suffering in the context of AGIs, simulated brains, even video game characters.

We can be anti-realists about suffering (suffering-is-a-node-in-the-network-of-language), or we can argue that we can talk coherently about suffering in novel contexts (AGIs, mind crime, aliens, and so on), but it seems inherently troublesome to claim we can do both at the same time.

Objection 2: Intuition duels

Two people can agree on FRI’s position that there is no objective fact of the matter about what suffering is (no privileged definition), but this also means they have no way of coming to any consensus on the object-level question of whether something can suffer. This isn’t just an academic point: Brian has written extensively about how he believes non-human animals can and do suffer extensively, whereas Yudkowsky (who holds computationalist views, like Brian) has written about how he’s confident that animals are not conscious and cannot suffer, due to their lack of higher-order reasoning.

And if functionalism is having trouble adjudicating the easy cases of suffering–whether monkeys can suffer, or whether dogs can— it doesn’t have a sliver of a chance at dealing with the upcoming hard cases of suffering: whether a given AGI is suffering, or engaging in mind crime; whether a whole-brain emulation (WBE) or synthetic organism or emergent intelligence that doesn’t have the capacity to tell us how it feels (or that we don’t have the capacity to understand) is suffering; if any aliens that we meet in the future can suffer; whether changing the internal architecture of our qualia reports means we’re also changing our qualia; and so on.

In short, FRI’s theory of consciousness isn’t actually a theory of consciousness at all, since it doesn’t do the thing we need a theory of consciousness to do: adjudicate disagreements in a principled way. Instead, it gives up any claim on the sorts of objective facts which could in principle adjudicate disagreements.

This is a source of friction in EA today, but it’s mitigated by the sense that

(1) The EA pie is growing, so it’s better to ignore disagreements than pick fights;

(2) Disagreements over the definition of suffering don’t really matter yet, since we haven’t gotten into the business of making morally-relevant synthetic beings (that we know of) that might be unable to vocalize their suffering.

If the perception of one or both of these conditions change, the lack of some disagreement-adjudicating theory of suffering will matter quite a lot.

Objection 3: Convergence requires common truth

Mike: “[W]hat makes one definition of consciousness better than another? How should we evaluate them?”

Brian: “Consilience among our feelings of empathy, principles of non-discrimination, understandings of cognitive science, etc. It’s similar to the question of what makes one definition of justice or virtue better than another.”

Brian is hoping that affective neuroscience will slowly converge to accurate views on suffering as more and better data about sentience and pain accumulates. But convergence to truth implies something (objective) driving the convergence- in this way, Brian’s framework still seems to require an objective truth of the matter, even though he disclaims most of the benefits of assuming this.

Objection 4: Assuming that consciousness is a reification produces more confusion, not less

Brian: “Consciousness is not a reified thing; it’s not a physical property of the universe that just exists intrinsically. Rather, instances of consciousness are algorithms that are implemented in specific steps. … Consciousness involves specific things that brains do.”

Brian argues that we treat conscious/phenomenology as more ‘real’ than it is. Traditionally, whenever we’ve discovered something is a leaky reification and shouldn’t be treated as ‘too real’, we’ve been able to break it down into more coherent constituent pieces we can treat as real. Life, for instance, wasn’t due to élan vital but a bundle of self-organizing properties & dynamics which generally co-occur. But carrying out this “de-reification” process on consciousness– enumerating its coherent constituent pieces– has proven difficult, especially if we want to preserve some way to speak cogently about suffering.

Speaking for myself, the more I stared into the depths of functionalism, the less certain everything about moral value became– and arguably, I see the same trajectory in Brian’s work and Luke Muehlhauser’s report. Their model uncertainty has seemingly become larger as they’ve looked into techniques for how to “de-reify” consciousness while preserving some flavor of moral value, not smaller. Brian and Luke seem to interpret this as evidence that moral value is intractably complicated, but this is also consistent with consciousness not being a reification, and instead being a real thing. Trying to “de-reify” something that’s not a reification will produce deep confusion, just as surely trying to treat a reification as ‘more real’ than it actually is will.

Edsger W. Dijkstra famously noted that “The purpose of abstraction is not to be vague, but to create a new semantic level in which one can be absolutely precise.” And so if our ways of talking about moral value fail to ‘carve reality at the joints’- then by all means let’s build better ones, rather than giving up on precision.

Objection 5: The Hard Problem of Consciousness is a red herring

Brian spends a lot of time discussing Chalmers’ “Hard Problem of Consciousness”, i.e. the question of why we’re subjectively conscious, and seems to base at least part of his conclusion on not finding this question compelling— he suggests “There’s no hard problem of consciousness for the same reason there’s no hard problem of life: consciousness is just a high-level word that we use to refer to lots of detailed processes, and it doesn’t mean anything in addition to those processes.” I.e., no ‘why’ is necessary; when we take consciousness and subtract out the details of the brain, we’re left with an empty set.

But I think the “Hard Problem” isn’t helpful as a contrastive centerpiece, since it’s unclear what the problem is, and whether it’s analytic or empirical, a statement about cognition or about physics. At the Qualia Research Institute (QRI), we don’t talk much about the Hard Problem; instead, we talk about Qualia Formalism, or the idea that any phenomenological state can be crisply and precisely represented by some mathematical object. I suspect this would be a better foil for Brian’s work than the Hard Problem.

Objection 6: Mapping to reality

Brian argues that consciousness should be defined at the functional/computational level: given a Turing machine, or neural network, the right ‘code’ will produce consciousness. But the problem is that this doesn’t lead to a theory which can ‘compile’ to physics. Consider the following:

Imagine you have a bag of popcorn. Now shake it. There will exist a certain ad-hoc interpretation of bag-of-popcorn-as-computational-system where you just simulated someone getting tortured, and other interpretations that don’t imply that. Did you torture anyone? If you’re a computationalist, no clear answer exists- you both did, and did not, torture someone. This sounds like a ridiculous edge-case that would never come up in real life, but in reality it comes up all the time, since there is no principled way to *objectively derive* what computation(s) any physical system is performing.

I don’t think this is an outlandish view of functionalism; Brian suggests much the same in How to Interpret a Physical System as a Mind: “Physicalist views that directly map from physics to moral value are relatively simple to understand. Functionalism is more complex, because it maps from physics to computations to moral value. Moreover, while physics is real and objective, computations are fictional and ‘observer-relative’ (to use John Searle’s terminology). There’s no objective meaning to ‘the computation that this physical system is implementing’ (unless you’re referring to the specific equations of physics that the system is playing out).”

Gordon McCabe (McCabe 2004) provides a more formal argument to this effect— that precisely mapping between physical processes and (Turing-level) computational processes is inherently impossible— in the context of simulations. First, McCabe notes that:

[T]here is a one-[to-]many correspondence between the logical states [of a computer] and the exact electronic states of computer memory. Although there are bijective mappings between numbers and the logical states of computer memory, there are no bijective mappings between numbers and the exact electronic states of memory.

This lack of an exact bijective mapping means that subjective interpretation necessarily creeps in, and so a computational simulation of a physical system can’t be ‘about’ that system in any rigorous way:

In a computer simulation, the values of the physical quantities possessed by the simulated system are represented by the combined states of multiple bits in computer memory. However, the combined states of multiple bits in computer memory only represent numbers because they are deemed to do so under a numeric interpretation. There are many different interpretations of the combined states of multiple bits in computer memory. If the numbers represented by a digital computer are interpretation-dependent, they cannot be objective physical properties. Hence, there can be no objective relationship between the changing pattern of multiple bit-states in computer memory, and the changing pattern of quantity-values of a simulated physical system.

McCabe concludes that, metaphysically speaking,

A digital computer simulation of a physical system cannot exist as, (does not possess the properties and relationships of), anything else other than a physical process occurring upon the components of a computer. In the contemporary case of an electronic digital computer, a simulation cannot exist as anything else other than an electronic physical process occurring upon the components and circuitry of a computer.

Where does this leave ethics? In Flavors of Computation Are Flavors of Consciousness, Brian notes that “In some sense all I’ve proposed here is to think of different flavors of computation as being various flavors of consciousness. But this still leaves the question: Which flavors of computation matter most? Clearly whatever computations happen when a person is in pain are vastly more important than what’s happening in a brain on a lazy afternoon. How can we capture that difference?”

But if Brian grants the former point- that “There’s no objective meaning to ‘the computation that this physical system is implementing’”– then this latter task of figuring out “which flavors of computation matter most” is provably impossible. There will always be multiple computational (and thus ethical) interpretations of a physical system, with no way to figure out what’s “really” happening. No way to figure out if something is suffering or not. No consilience; not now, not ever.

Note: despite apparently granting the point above, Brian also remarks that:

I should add a note on terminology: All computations occur within physics, so any computation is a physical process. Conversely, any physical process proceeds from input conditions to output conditions in a regular manner and so is a computation. Hence, the set of computations equals the set of physical processes, and where I say “computations” in this piece, one could just as well substitute “physical processes” instead.

This seems to be (1) incorrect, for the reasons I give above, or (2) taking substantial poetic license with these terms, or (3) referring to hypercomputation (which might be able to salvage the metaphor, but would invalidate many of FRI’s conclusions dealing with the computability of suffering on conventional hardware).

This objection may seem esoteric or pedantic, but I think it’s important, and that it ripples through FRI’s theoretical framework with disastrous effects.

 

Objection 7: FRI doesn’t fully bite the bullet on computationalism

Brian suggests that “flavors of computation are flavors of consciousness” and that some computations ‘code’ for suffering. But if we do in fact bite the bullet on this metaphor and place suffering within the realm of computational theory, we need to think in “near mode” and accept all the paradoxes that brings. Scott Aaronson, a noted expert on quantum computing, raises the following objections to functionalism:

I’m guessing that many people in this room side with Dennett, and (not coincidentally, I’d say) also with Everett. I certainly have sympathies in that direction too. In fact, I spent seven or eight years of my life as a Dennett/Everett hardcore believer. But, while I don’t want to talk anyone out of the Dennett/Everett view, I’d like to take you on a tour of what I see as some of the extremely interesting questions that that view leaves unanswered. I’m not talking about “deep questions of meaning,” but about something much more straightforward: what exactly does a computational process have to do to qualify as “conscious”?

 

…

 

There’s this old chestnut, what if each person on earth simulated one neuron of your brain, by passing pieces of paper around. It took them several years just to simulate a single second of your thought processes. Would that bring your subjectivity into being? Would you accept it as a replacement for your current body? If so, then what if your brain were simulated, not neuron-by-neuron, but by a gigantic lookup table? That is, what if there were a huge database, much larger than the observable universe (but let’s not worry about that), that hardwired what your brain’s response was to every sequence of stimuli that your sense-organs could possibly receive. Would that bring about your consciousness? Let’s keep pushing: if it would, would it make a difference if anyone actually consulted the lookup table? Why can’t it bring about your consciousness just by sitting there doing nothing?

To these standard thought experiments, we can add more. Let’s suppose that, purely for error-correction purposes, the computer that’s simulating your brain runs the code three times, and takes the majority vote of the outcomes. Would that bring three “copies” of your consciousness into being? Does it make a difference if the three copies are widely separated in space or time—say, on different planets, or in different centuries? Is it possible that the massive redundancy taking place in your brain right now is bringing multiple copies of you into being?

 

…

 

Maybe my favorite thought experiment along these lines was invented by my former student Andy Drucker.  In the past five years, there’s been a revolution in theoretical cryptography, around something called Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), which was first discovered by Craig Gentry.  What FHE lets you do is to perform arbitrary computations on encrypted data, without ever decrypting the data at any point.  So, to someone with the decryption key, you could be proving theorems, simulating planetary motions, etc.  But to someone without the key, it looks for all the world like you’re just shuffling random strings and producing other random strings as output.

 

You can probably see where this is going.  What if we homomorphically encrypted a simulation of your brain?  And what if we hid the only copy of the decryption key, let’s say in another galaxy?  Would this computation—which looks to anyone in our galaxy like a reshuffling of gobbledygook—be silently producing your consciousness?

 

When we consider the possibility of a conscious quantum computer, in some sense we inherit all the previous puzzles about conscious classical computers, but then also add a few new ones.  So, let’s say I run a quantum subroutine that simulates your brain, by applying some unitary transformation U.  But then, of course, I want to “uncompute” to get rid of garbage (and thereby enable interference between different branches), so I apply U-1.  Question: when I apply U-1, does your simulated brain experience the same thoughts and feelings a second time?  Is the second experience “the same as” the first, or does it differ somehow, by virtue of being reversed in time? Or, since U-1U is just a convoluted implementation of the identity function, are there no experiences at all here?

 

Here’s a better one: many of you have heard of the Vaidman bomb.  This is a famous thought experiment in quantum mechanics where there’s a package, and we’d like to “query” it to find out whether it contains a bomb—but if we query it and there is a bomb, it will explode, killing everyone in the room.  What’s the solution?  Well, suppose we could go into a superposition of querying the bomb and not querying it, with only ε amplitude on querying the bomb, and √(1-ε2) amplitude on not querying it.  And suppose we repeat this over and over—each time, moving ε amplitude onto the “query the bomb” state if there’s no bomb there, but moving ε2 probability onto the “query the bomb” state if there is a bomb (since the explosion decoheres the superposition).  Then after 1/ε repetitions, we’ll have order 1 probability of being in the “query the bomb” state if there’s no bomb.  By contrast, if there is a bomb, then the total probability we’ve ever entered that state is (1/ε)×ε2 = ε.  So, either way, we learn whether there’s a bomb, and the probability that we set the bomb off can be made arbitrarily small.  (Incidentally, this is extremely closely related to how Grover’s algorithm works.)

 

OK, now how about the Vaidman brain?  We’ve got a quantum subroutine simulating your brain, and we want to ask it a yes-or-no question.  We do so by querying that subroutine with ε amplitude 1/ε times, in such a way that if your answer is “yes,” then we’ve only ever activated the subroutine with total probability ε.  Yet you still manage to communicate your “yes” answer to the outside world.  So, should we say that you were conscious only in the ε fraction of the wavefunction where the simulation happened, or that the entire system was conscious?  (The answer could matter a lot for anthropic purposes.)

To sum up: Brian’s notion that consciousness is the same as computation raises more issues than it solves; in particular, the possibility that if suffering is computable, it may also be uncomputable/reversible, would suggest s-risks aren’t as serious as FRI treats them.

Objection 8: Dangerous combination

Three themes which seem to permeate FRI’s research are:

(1) Suffering is the thing that is bad.

(2) It’s critically important to eliminate badness from the universe.

(3) Suffering is impossible to define objectively, and so we each must define what suffering means for ourselves.

Taken individually, each of these seems reasonable. Pick two, and you’re still okay. Pick all three, though, and you get A Fully General Justification For Anything, based on what is ultimately a subjective/aesthetic call.

Much can be said in FRI’s defense here, and it’s unfair to single them out as risky: in my experience they’ve always brought a very thoughtful, measured, cooperative approach to the table. I would just note that ideas are powerful, and I think theme (3) is especially pernicious if incorrect.

III. QRI’s alternative

Analytic functionalism is essentially a negative hypothesis about consciousness: it’s the argument that there’s no order to be found, no rigor to be had. It obscures this with talk of “function”, which is a red herring it not only doesn’t define, but admits is undefinable. It doesn’t make any positive assertion. Functionalism is skepticism- nothing more, nothing less.

But is it right?

Ultimately, I think these a priori arguments are much like people in the middle ages arguing whether one could ever formalize a Proper System of Alchemy. Such arguments may in many cases hold water, but it’s often difficult to tell good arguments apart from arguments where we’re just cleverly fooling ourselves. In retrospect, the best way to *prove* systematized alchemy was possible was to just go out and *do* it, and invent Chemistry. That’s how I see what we’re doing at QRI with Qualia Formalism: we’re assuming it’s possible to build stuff, and we’re working on building the object-level stuff.

What we’ve built with QRI’s framework

Note: this is a brief, surface-level tour of our research; it will probably be confusing for readers who haven’t dug into our stuff before. Consider this a down-payment on a more substantial introduction.

My most notable work is Principia Qualia, in which I lay out my meta-framework for consciousness (a flavor of dual-aspect monism, with a focus on Qualia Formalism) and put forth the Symmetry Theory of Valence (STV). Essentially, the STV is an argument that much of the apparent complexity of emotional valence is evolutionarily contingent, and if we consider a mathematical object isomorphic to a phenomenological experience, the mathematical property which corresponds to how pleasant it is to be that experience is the object’s symmetry. This implies a bunch of testable predictions and reinterpretations of things like what ‘pleasure centers’ do (Section XI; Section XII). Building on this, I offer the Symmetry Theory of Homeostatic Regulation, which suggests understanding the structure of qualia will translate into knowledge about the structure of human intelligence, and I briefly touch on the idea of Neuroacoustics.

Likewise, my colleague Andrés Gómez Emilsson has written about the likely mathematics of phenomenology, including The Hyperbolic Geometry of DMT Experiences, Tyranny of the Intentional Object, and Algorithmic Reduction of Psychedelic States. If I had to suggest one thing to read in all of these links, though, it would be the transcript of his recent talk on Quantifying Bliss, which lays out the world’s first method to objectively measure valence from first principles (via fMRI) using Selen Atasoy’s Connectome Harmonics framework, the Symmetry Theory of Valence, and Andrés’s CDNS model of experience.

These are risky predictions and we don’t yet know if they’re right, but we’re confident that if there is some elegant structure intrinsic to consciousness, as there is in many other parts of the natural world, these are the right kind of risks to take.

I mention all this because I think analytic functionalism- which is to say radical skepticism/eliminativism, the metaphysics of last resort- only looks as good as it does because nobody’s been building out any alternatives.

IV. Closing thoughts

FRI is pursuing a certain research agenda, and QRI is pursuing another, and there’s lots of value in independent explorations of the nature of suffering. I’m glad FRI exists, everybody I’ve interacted with at FRI has been great, I’m happy they’re focusing on s-risks, and I look forward to seeing what they produce in the future.

On the other hand, I worry that nobody’s pushing back on FRI’s metaphysics, which seem to unavoidably lead to the intractable problems I describe above. FRI seems to believe these problems are part of the territory, unavoidable messes that we just have to make philosophical peace with. But I think that functionalism is a bad map, that the metaphysical messes it leads to are much worse than most people realize (fatal to FRI’s mission), and there are other options that avoid these problems (which, to be fair, is not to say they have no problems).

Ultimately, FRI doesn’t owe me a defense of their position. But if they’re open to suggestions on what it would take to convince a skeptic like me that their brand of functionalism is viable, or at least rescuable, I’d offer the following:

Re: Objection 1 (motte-and-bailey), I suggest FRI should be as clear and complete as possible in their basic definition of suffering. In which particular ways is it ineffable/fuzzy, and in which particular ways is it precise? What can we definitely say about suffering, and what can we definitely never determine? Preregistering ontological commitments and methodological possibilities would help guard against FRI’s definition of suffering changing based on context.

Re: Objection 2 (intuition duels), FRI may want to internally “war game” various future scenarios involving AGI, WBE, etc, with one side arguing that a given synthetic (or even extraterrestrial) organism is suffering, and the other side arguing that it isn’t. I’d expect this would help diagnose what sorts of disagreements future theories of suffering will need to adjudicate, and perhaps illuminate implicit ethical intuitions. Sharing the results of these simulated disagreements would also be helpful in making FRI’s reasoning less opaque to outsiders, although making everything transparent could lead to certain strategic disadvantages.

Re: Objection 3 (convergence requires common truth), I’d like FRI to explore exactly what might drive consilience/convergence in theories of suffering, and what precisely makes one theory of suffering better than another, and ideally to evaluate a range of example theories of suffering under these criteria.

Re: Objection 4 (assuming that consciousness is a reification produces more confusion, not less), I would love to see a historical treatment of reification: lists of reifications which were later dissolved (e.g., élan vital), vs scattered phenomena that were later unified (e.g., electromagnetism). What patterns do the former have, vs the latter, and why might consciousness fit one of these buckets better than the other?

Re: Objection 5 (the Hard Problem of Consciousness is a red herring), I’d like to see a more detailed treatment of what kinds of problem people have interpreted the Hard Problem as, and also more analysis on the prospects of Qualia Formalism (which I think is the maximally-empirical, maximally-charitable interpretation of the Hard Problem). It would be helpful for us, in particular, if FRI preregistered their expectations about QRI’s predictions, and their view of the relative evidence strength of each of our predictions.

Re: Objection 6 (mapping to reality), this is perhaps the heart of most of our disagreement. From Brian’s quotes, he seems split on this issue; I’d like clarification about whether he believes we can ever precisely/objectively map specific computations to specific physical systems, and vice-versa. And if so— how? If not, this seems to propagate through FRI’s ethical framework in a disastrous way, since anyone can argue that any physical system does, or does not, ‘code’ for massive suffering, and there’s no principled way to derive any ‘ground truth’ or even pick between interpretations in a principled way (e.g. my popcorn example). If this isn’t the case— why not?

Brian has suggested that “certain high-level interpretations of physical systems are more ‘natural’ and useful than others” (personal communication); I agree, and would encourage FRI to explore systematizing this.

It would be non-trivial to port FRI’s theories and computational intuitions to the framework of “hypercomputation”– i.e., the understanding that there’s a formal hierarchy of computational systems, and that Turing machines are only one level of many– but it may have benefits too. Namely, it might be the only way they could avoid Objection 6 (which I think is a fatal objection) while still allowing them to speak about computation & consciousness in the same breath. I think FRI should look at this and see if it makes sense to them.

Re: Objection 7 (FRI doesn’t fully bite the bullet on computationalism), I’d like to see responses to Aaronson’s aforementioned thought experiments.

Re: Objection 8 (dangerous combination), I’d like to see a clarification about why my interpretation is unreasonable (as it very well may be!).

 


In conclusion- I think FRI has a critically important goal- reduction of suffering & s-risk. However, I also think FRI has painted itself into a corner by explicitly disallowing a clear, disagreement-mediating definition for what these things are. I look forward to further work in this field.

 

Mike Johnson

Qualia Research Institute


Acknowledgements: thanks to Andrés Gómez Emilsson, Brian Tomasik, and Max Daniel for reviewing earlier drafts of this.

Sources:

My sources for FRI’s views on consciousness:
Flavors of Computation are Flavors of Consciousness:
https://foundational-research.org/flavors-of-computation-are-flavors-of-consciousness/
Is There a Hard Problem of Consciousness?
http://reducing-suffering.org/hard-problem-consciousness/
Consciousness Is a Process, Not a Moment
http://reducing-suffering.org/consciousness-is-a-process-not-a-moment/
How to Interpret a Physical System as a Mind
http://reducing-suffering.org/interpret-physical-system-mind/
Dissolving Confusion about Consciousness
http://reducing-suffering.org/dissolving-confusion-about-consciousness/
Debate between Brian & Mike on consciousness:
https://www.facebook.com/groups/effective.altruists/permalink/1333798200009867/?comment_id=1333823816673972&comment_tracking=%7B%22tn%22%3A%22R9%22%7D
Max Daniel’s EA Global Boston 2017 talk on s-risks:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jiZxEJcFExc
Multipolar debate between Eliezer Yudkowsky and various rationalists about animal suffering:
https://rationalconspiracy.com/2015/12/16/a-debate-on-animal-consciousness/
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy on functionalism:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/functism/
Gordon McCabe on why computation doesn’t map to physics:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1891/1/UniverseCreationComputer.pdf
Toby Ord on hypercomputation, and how it differs from Turing’s work:
https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0209332
Luke Muehlhauser’s OpenPhil-funded report on consciousness and moral patienthood:
http://www.openphilanthropy.org/2017-report-consciousness-and-moral-patienthood
Scott Aaronson’s thought experiments on computationalism:
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1951
Selen Atasoy on Connectome Harmonics, a new way to understand brain activity:
https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms10340
My work on formalizing phenomenology:
My meta-framework for consciousness, including the Symmetry Theory of Valence:
http://opentheory.net/PrincipiaQualia.pdf
My hypothesis of homeostatic regulation, which touches on why we seek out pleasure:
http://opentheory.net/2017/05/why-we-seek-out-pleasure-the-symmetry-theory-of-homeostatic-regulation/
My exploration & parametrization of the ‘neuroacoustics’ metaphor suggested by Atasoy’s work:
http://opentheory.net/2017/06/taking-brain-waves-seriously-neuroacoustics/
My colleague Andrés’s work on formalizing phenomenology:
A model of DMT-trip-as-hyperbolic-experience:
https://qualiacomputing.com/2017/05/28/eli5-the-hyperbolic-geometry-of-dmt-experiences/
June 2017 talk at Consciousness Hacking, describing a theory and experiment to predict people’s valence from fMRI data:
https://qualiacomputing.com/2017/06/18/quantifying-bliss-talk-summary/
A parametrization of various psychedelic states as operators in qualia space:
https://qualiacomputing.com/2016/06/20/algorithmic-reduction-of-psychedelic-states/
A brief post on valence and the fundamental attribution error:
https://qualiacomputing.com/2016/11/19/the-tyranny-of-the-intentional-object/
A summary of some of Selen Atasoy’s current work on Connectome Harmonics:
https://qualiacomputing.com/2017/06/18/connectome-specific-harmonic-waves-on-lsd/